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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, in that this Court has jurisdiction to review final orders and
decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies. The
Utah Labor Commission issued its final order in this case on October 21, 2004.
(Record, p. 494).1 The Petitioner filed his Petition For Review on November 18,
2004.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether substantial evidence existed for the Utah Labor

Commission Appeals Board to conclude that Salt Lake County's proffered
legitimate non-discriminatory justification for not advancing the Petitioner was
non-pretextual and did not discriminate against the Petitioner based upon his
national origin.
A.

Standard of review. The appellate court employs an

intermediate standard of review to the agency's determination and to its
application of law to the facts. Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial
Commission, 958 P.2d 240, 242 (Ut. App. 1997). In doing so, it looks for an
abuse of discretion in applying the law to the facts. ]d., P- 243. In applying that
standard, the appellate court determines whether the agency decision exceeded
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. ]d.

1

All references to the record on appeal will be "Record, p.
included in the appeal will be "Transcript, ".

". All references to the transcript
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B.

Preservation of issue. The Respondent raised this issue in

its Motion For Review. (Record, p. 454-467). The Petitioner also raised this
issue in his Response to Respondent's Motion For Review. (Record, p. 469-

481).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Section 17-33-1 U.C.A. (1953), as amended,2 requires certain counties,
including Salt Lake County, to adopt merit systems under the County Personnel
Management Act ("CPMA"). (Addendum C). "'Merit system1 means a system of
personnel administration based on the principles set forth in Section 17-33-3." §
17-33-2(7). Section 17-33-3 provides:
"It is the policy of this state that each county may establish a personnel
system administered in a manner that will provide for the effective
implementation of the following merit principles:
(1) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis
of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills, including open
consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment;
(2) provision of equitable and adequate compensation;
(3) training of employees as needed to assure high-quality
performance;
(4) retention of employees on the basis of the adequacy of their
performance, and separation of employees whose inadequate
performance cannot be corrected;
(5) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of
personnel administration without regard to race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, political affiliation, age, or disability, and
with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights as
citizens;
(6) provision of information to employees regarding their political
rights and prohibited practices under the Hatch Act; and

2

Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references shall be to U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
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(7) provision of a formal procedure for processing the appeals and
grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion,
restraint, or reprisal."
The CPMA requires each county to appoint a three-member bipartisan
career service council. §17-33-4. In addition, each county is required to create
an office of personnel management administered by a director. §17-33-5. The
director is required to recommend personnel rules for the county to adopt. The
CPMA identifies the rules to be adopted in Section 17-33-5(3)(b):
"(b) The rules shall provide for:
(i)
recruiting efforts to be planned and carried out in a manner
that assures open competition, with special emphasis to be
placed on recruiting efforts to attract minorities, women,
persons with a disability as defined by and covered under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
12102, or other groups that are substantially
underrepresented in the county work force to help assure
they will be among the candidates from whom appointments
are made;
(ii)
the establishment of job related minimum requirements
wherever practical, that all successful candidates shall be
required to meet in order to be eligible for consideration for
appointment or promotion;
(iii)
selection procedures that include consideration of the
relative merit of each applicant for employment, a job related
method of determining the eligibility or ineligibility of each
applicant, and a valid, reliable, and objective system of
ranking eligible applicants according to their qualifications
and merit;
***

(ix)

temporary, provisional, or other noncareer service
appointments, which may not be used as a way of defeating
the purpose of the career service and may not exceed 90
days, with the period extendable for a period not to exceed
an additional 90 days for good cause;
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promotion and career ladder advancement of employees to
higher level positions and assurance that all persons promoted
are qualified for the position;
***

(xiii)

preparation, maintenance, and revision of a position
classification plan for all positions in the career service,
based upon similarity of duties performed and
responsibilities assumed, so that the same qualifications
may reasonably be required for, and the same schedule of
pay be equitably applied to, all positions in the same class,
the compensation plan, in order to maintain a high quality
public work force, to take into account the responsibility and
difficulty of the work, the comparative pay and benefits
needed to compete in the labor market and to stay in proper
alignment with other similar governmental units, and other
factors; ..."

Pursuant to the CPMA, Salt Lake County adopted a merit system and
corresponding career ladder positions. Pertinent to this action are three policies
found in the appellate record, Policy 5100 relating to "Employment Status"
(Record, p. 523)(Addendum D), Policy 5200 relating to "Allocation And
Classification of Merit Positions" (Record, p. 535)(Addendum E), and Policy 5400
relating to "Pay Practices" (Record, p. 518)(Addendum F).
Under Salt Lake County's merit system, employees do not necessarily
"apply" for career ladder advancements. (Transcript, p. 161). Instead, it is the
supervisor's responsibility to recognize that an inferior employee possesses the
minimum qualifications for a career ladder advancement and automatically
advance the employee accordingly, (id-)- However, an employee may also
advance by applying for a new or vacated position, if a recruitment notice is
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posted by Salt Lake County's Personnel Office and the employee qualifies and is
selected for the position. (JdL, P- 158).
Policy 5400, Part 4.0 provides that the minimum qualifications for county
positions shall be set by the county's personnel division:
"4.0

Minimum qualifications for County positions shall be set by the
Personnel Division.
4.01 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet the
new minimum qualifications as established by personnel,
and is not required to do so by law, he or she shall be
grandfathered into the reclassified position.
4.02 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet the
New minimum qualifications and is required to do so by law,
grandfathering shall be prohibited and the following
procedures shall apply:
4.2.1 Probationary employees will be terminated in good
standing.
4.2.2 Merit employees may be transferred, reassigned, or
promoted to another position in accordance with
Personnel Policy and Procedure: Pay Practices; OR
4.2.3 The employee may be terminated in accordance with
Personnel Policy and Procedure: Reduction-in-Force
Separations."

As more described below, under Background Facts, Salt Lake County's
Personnel Division established minimum career ladder qualifications for all
county engineers on April 1, 1980. (Record, p. 334, Petitioner's Exhibit
3)(Addendum G). Significant to this action is the following provision:
"The purpose of this memo is to outline procedures for applying with the
State of Utah Department of Transportation to take the Engineer
Qualifying Examination given every December. All County Engineers
assigned to the grade 24, 26, 28 career ladder must pass the EQE or the
EIT to be eligible for promotion to grade 26."
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On March 16, 2000, the career ladder plan was changed in three Public
Works divisions: Flood Control, Engineering and Planning/Development
Services. (Record, p. 364, Petitioner's Exhibit 11)(Addendum H). The minimum
qualifications for moving from an Engineer 26 to 28 within the career ladder were:
"1. The employee has worked for one year as a grade 26.
2. The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties the year as
shown by receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory rating.
3. The employee has received their Fundamentals of Engineering (FE)
certification by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering."3
The minimum qualifications for moving from an Engineer 28 to 30 within the
career ladder were:
1. The employee has worked for one year as a grade 28.
2. The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year
as shown by receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory
rating.
3. The employee has received their Professional Engineering (PE)
License in the State of Utah."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case. This action arises under Utah's Anti-Discrimination
Act, §34A-5-101 et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as amended. The Petitioner, an
engineer, alleged that Respondent, Salt Lake County, failed to advance him from
an entry level position in its career ladder system for over twenty-seven (27)
years. Acknowledging that he did not have an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE, he claimed
that other less qualified white, non-Arabic, non-Iranian/Persian engineers were
advanced by the Respondent without having the same credentials he lacked. He

3

The Fundamentals of Engineering Examination described in the March 16, 2000, policy was a
new examination and replaced the EQE and EIT Examinations required under the April 1, 1980,
policy. (Transcript, p. 286 and 297).
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claimed discrimination on the basis of national origin. He also claimed retaliation
after he received a lesser evaluation following the filing of his charge.4
Course of proceedings. The Petitioner filed a Charge Of Discrimination
with the Utah Labor Commission on November 16, 1999. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8,
Record, p. 356). An evidentiary hearing occurred on April 14, 2003, before
Richard M. LaJeunesse, Administrative Law Judge, Utah Labor Commission. On
October 9, 2003, ALJ LaJenunesse found in favor of the Petitioner and issued his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (Record, p. 411)(Addendum A).
ALJ LaJenunesse found:
"None of the six white males promoted from entry level engineers to
higher grades over Mr. Tarkeshian obtained a PE license and/or
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests as required by Salt
Lake County's written policies. Salt Lake County argued exceptions
applied for each promotion of the six white males who lacked a PE license
and/or qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests. The
preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed that the exceptions
articulated by Salt Lake County in promoting white, non-Arabic, nonPersian engineers served as pretexts to mask a subtle discrimination
against Mr. Tarkeshian in violation of § 34A-5-106. It is incomprehensible
that Mr. Tarkeshian who in many cases had more experience and
education than those promoted over him sat in an entry level engineering
position for 26 years while Salt Lake County found various and sundry
exceptions to the written rules in order to promote white, non-arabic, nonIranian/Persian males. Salt Lake County always seemed able to find an
exception to the rules that bound Mr. Tarkeshian to an entry level position
in order to promote everyone but Mr. Tarkeshian." (Id., p. 420).
ALJ La Jeunesse ordered Respondent Salt Lake County to immediately advance
Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 26 engineer for a specified time period and to a grade

4

The Petitioner abandon's this claim on appeal in order to focus entirely on his main claim of
discrimination.
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28 engineer effective April 16, 2000. (Id., p. 422). He also ordered Respondent
County to reimburse him in the form of backpay for the difference in pay he
actually received from what he should have received. On October 30, 2003, ALJ
La Jeunesse issued a Supplement Order awarding Mr. Tarkeshian attorney's
fees and costs. (Record, p. 449).
Disposition below. Salt Lake County filed a Motion For Review on
November 6, 2003. (Record, p. 452). Nearly a year later, on October 21, 2004,
the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board "substitute^] its judgment" for that of
ALJ La Jeunesse, and dismissed the Plaintiffs action. (Record, p.
494)(Addendum B). The Appeals Board found that the Petitioner had
established his prima facie case of discrimination using the burden-shifting
analysis imposed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
(id-, p. 498). Likewise, the Appeals Board found that the Respondent County
fulfilled its burden of identifying an alleged non-discriminatory explanation of its
treatment of the Petitioner. (Jd.). The Appeals Board then substituted its
judgment for that of its own ALJ on the issue of pretext by concluding, "...the socalled disparities in treatment are attributable to the other engineers meeting the
County's requirements for advancement and other legitimate reasons that are not
related to Mr. Tarkeshian's national origin." (id).
The Petitioner filed his Petition For Review with this Court on November
18,2004.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
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A.

DESCRIPTION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY'S DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT.

Salt Lake County's Public Works Department is made up of eleven
separate payroll units, or divisions, who report to the Public Works Director.
(Petitioner's Exhibit 12, Record, p. 365).5 Three of the eleven divisions employ
engineers. They are Development Services, Public Works Engineering and
Flood Control Engineering. (]d-)- Salt Lake County historically employs a total of
approximately 14-15 FTE engineers in its Flood Control Division and
approximately 8-12 FTE engineers in its other public works sectors. (Record, p.
367).
The organizational chart for Development Services is found at Record, p.
554. This Subdivision is responsible for subdivision permits and urban
hydrology.6 (Record, p. 554). During a significant portion of the past, the head of
the Subdivision was Brent Tidwell. (\_d.). Some engineers in Development
Services review plat plans, and subdivision plans in their review process and

5

The Petitioner has attempted to "marshal" all of the facts in fulfillment of his duty to marshal the
facts on appeal. Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Div. of State, 842 P.2d 887 (1992).
Accordingly, the Petitioner will bring out the Respondent's positions on factual issues, and
relevant facts in support thereof, while reviewing all of the evidence submitted at the trial on the
factual issues presented.
6
Development Services was developed by Salt Lake County in September, 1983. It was for the
purpose of bringing together personnel who were involved in permits for development. Among
others, licensed engineers in Flood Control who were reviewing private development projects
were transferred to Development Services. This was done to better coordinate their
responsibilities with others involved in development review and inspections for Salt Lake County.
(R. 569,112).
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therefore review some surveying work, but are not surveyors. (Transcript, p.
128).
The organizational chart for the Public Works Engineering and Flood
Control Engineering is found at Record, p. 663. Engineers in the Public Works
Engineering Division and the Flood Control Engineering Division are identified as
being in the Engineering Division. (Record, p. 366). The Petitioner was
employed in the Flood Control Engineering Division in design during the entire
period of his employment.
B.

BACKGROUND FACTS.

The Petitioner received a Bachelor Of Science in Civil Engineering from
the University of Idaho in 1975. He previously received an Associates Degree in
Engineering from Idaho State University in 1968 along with a Bachelor's degree
in mathematics in the same year. (Transcript, p. 23-24, Petitioner's Exhibit 1,
Record, p. 337). He had also received a diploma in Industrial Drafting from the
National Technical School of Los Angeles. From 1975 to 1976, he worked for
Bush & Gudgell as an engineer's aid, and in 1976, worked for Call Engineering
as a design draftsman, (id.)- In January, 1977, the Petitioner went to work for
Salt Lake County's Surveyor's Office as a designer.
In May, 1977, the Petitioner applied for and received an entry level grade
24 engineer's position with Salt Lake County in its Public Works Department,
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Flood Control Division.7 (]d.). He had nearly eight years of engineering related
work prior to his employment with Salt Lake County. (Transcript, p. 26).
In 1979, a grade 26 engineer position became open in Salt Lake County's
Public Works, Flood Control Division, (id-, p. 27). The only requirement was that
the applicant have a Bachelors of Science Degree in Engineering, (jd-)- After
interviewing for the position, he was advised by Salt Lake County's Personnel
Manager on November 23, 1979, that the County decided not to fill the position,
(id-, P- 28, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Record, p. 343). Nevertheless, Salt Lake
County filled the position "internally" with another person. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4,
1J1, Record, p. 346).
Four months later, on April 1, 1980, Salt Lake County's Personnel Division
decided to issue a new policy regarding career ladder progression for its
engineers. (Addendum G). The new policy required grade 24 engineers to take
an Engineer Qualifying Examination ("EQE") or an Engineer In Training
Examination ("EIT") in order to possess the minimum qualifications for
advancement to grade 26. (]d.).
Notwithstanding the new policy, Salt Lake County promoted Brent Tidwell
from a grade 24 to a grade 27 who lacked the minimum qualifications of EQE or
EIT. Mr. Tidwell also lacked an engineering degree and a PE (Professional
Engineer) license. (Transcript, p. 32). In response, the Petitioner filed a

7

At that time, and until a reclassification in May, 2000, the classification career ladder for
engineers was grades 24/26/28. In May, 2000, the engineering position was reclassified to
grades 26/28/30.
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grievance alleging unfairness. (]d.). The Director of the Public Work's
Department answered the Petitioner's grievance on December 17, 1980, by
stating that Mr. Tidwell "...was given 'Grandfather' status by the Personnel
Department with full knowledge of career ladder requirements...." (Petitioner's
Exhibit 4, Record, p. 346-347). The Petitioner appealed the Director's decision to
the Salt Lake County Merit Council. A full hearing was held on February 5, 1981.
On February 10, 1981, the Merit Council issued a decision that allowed the
"Grandfathering" of Mr. Tidwell but concluded:
"13. If and when said employee leaves the position, it must be filled by
an engineer who is qualified according to the career ladder to possess not
only the EIT certificate, or pass the EQE, but must also hold a
Professional Engineer (PE) license." (Record, p. 349-351).
C.

SALT LAKE COUNTY'S 2000 RECLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.

On March 16, 2000, Salt Lake County's Public Works Department
"reclassified" its career ladder for engineers from a 24/26/28 grade ladder to a
26/28/30 career ladder.8 (Record, p. 364, Transcript, 70, Addendum H). This
classification was for all engineers employed by Public Works: Flood Control,
Engineering and Development Services, (id.).
Progression from grade 26 to grade 28 required being employed as a
grade 26 engineer for one year, a satisfactory performance evaluation and the
receipt of a FE Certificate (Fundamentals of Engineering Certificate by the

Engineers employed In the grade 24 entry level were automatically advanced to the grade 26
entry level.
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National Council of Examiners for Engineering).9 Progression for a grade 28 to a
grade 30 required being employed as a grade 28 for one year, a satisfactory
performance evaluation and the receipt of their PE (Professional Engineering)
License. (Id-)- Roy J. Arrigo, Classification and Compensation Manager for Salt
Lake County testified at trial that the entry level for an engineer also required a
bachelor's degree in civil engineering or four years of equivalent experience.
(Transcript, p. 230).
Mr. Arrigo testified as to the relationship between the 26, 28, and 30
ladders. He testified there "really isn't" any difference in job duties between a
grade 26 and grade 28 engineer. "[T]hey're all doing the same kind of work."
(Transcript, p. 231). However, by having demonstrated proficiency by obtaining
the FE, the employee's supervisor would probably spend less time supervising,
(id-)- O n the other hand, an engineer grade 30 is required to "sign off" on
engineering documents and the PE is required. (Transcript, p. 232).
D.

CAREER LADDER PROMOTIONS FROM 1980-2000.

After 1980, the Petitioner noticed that engineers, other than Mr. Tidwell
who was grandfathered, were being promoted but lacked the minimum
qualifications. As noted earlier, under Salt Lake County's merit system, an
employee does not necessarily "apply" for advancement; instead, it is incumbent
upon the employee's supervisor to recognize that an employee has the minimal

9

As noted in footnote 3 above, the FE replaced the EIT and EQE requirements.
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qualifications for advancement and do it automatically by preparing an
appropriate personnel action form. (Transcript, p. 161).
In this case, the Petitioner was the only person in the Public Works
Department that was never promoted for over 27 years and he remains to this
day in his entry level position. (Transcript, p. 95). At the hearing before ALJ La
Jeuness, the Petitioner identified seven specific white engineers who did not
possess the minimum qualifications, and were less qualified than the Petitioner,
yet, were advanced or promoted by Salt Lake County over the years. They are
identified as follows:
1.

Brent Tidwell. Brent Tidwell did not hold an engineering

degree. As mentioned above, the Merit Council issued a decision in 1981 that
allowed the "grandfathering" of Mr. Tidwell but cautioned that his position would
have to be filled by a qualified individual. He was the section manager of the
Development Services Engineering Subsection.10 In March, 1985, Brent Tidwell
was being promoted from grade 27 to grade 30 and Salt Lake County's Senior
Personnel Analyst, Sharon Hoglund, questioned whether he should be the
section manager as he lacked a surveyor's license and Section 58-22-1 required
a registered surveyor to perform land surveying functions. Apparently, he was
instructed to obtain a surveyor's license in 1979. (R. 568). He was allowed three
more years to obtain a surveyor's license (R. 569) but was promoted to grade 28

See footnote 6.
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nevertheless on July 31, 1985, (R. 578).11 Therefore, at the time of his
promotion, Mr.Tidwell lacked any of the required minimum qualifications of EQE,
EIT, PE, or even a surveyor's license. On November 6, 1985, Mr. Tidwell
obtained his land surveyor's license and was promoted to grade 30. (R. 575).
Mr. Tidwell retired in early 1998.
2.

Reid Demman. Reid Demman did not hold an engineering

degree. (Transcript, p. 77). He did hold, however, a four-year H.E.T. Certificate
(Highway Engineering Technology) from the University of Utah/BYU. (R. 540).
He did not have an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE. (R. 374, Transcript, p. 150). He had
been employed in the Public Works Engineering as a survey technician 18, and
worked below the Petitioner, until 1984 when he transferred to Development
Services to be an engineering technician 19. (Transcript, p. 78 and Record, p.
540). In 1991, he was awarded a grade 24 engineer position. (R. 540).
Mr. Demman obtained a Land Surveyor's License on January 30,
1998. (R. 577). On February 1, 1998, he was "promoted" to the position of
Engineering Subdivision Section Manager, Development Services, at a grade 30.
He did not complete an application. (R. 374). He did not have any prior
managerial or supervisory experience. (Transcript, p. 222). He replaced Brent
Tidwell who, as described above, retired in early 1998. (Transcript, p. 150).

11

It is interesting that, when Mr. Tidwell was approved for a grade 28 promotion, the Director of
Development Services and the Associate Director of Public Works advised the Classification
Selection Manager for the Administrative Services Department that "neither the surveyor's or
engineer's license was required to perform the duties of this position." (R. 578).
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Salt Lake County admitted that Mr. Demman lacked the necessary
qualifications to fill Brent Tidwell's position as directed by the Salt Lake County
Merit Council when it grandfathered Mr. TidwelL (R. 150). In response, Salt
Lake County asserted the minimum qualifications were met by Mr. Demmen's
Land Surveyor's License. (R. 151).
According to the testimony of Roy J. Arrigo, Salt Lake County's
Classification and Compensation Manager, some engineers in Development
Services review land surveying functions in addition to their engineering
functions. The reason is that Development Services often involves the review of
plats and subdivision designs where right-of-ways and other surveying functions
occur. (Transcript, p. 278). Therefore, according to Salt Lake County, having a
land surveyor's license is more valuable to the Development Services
Subdivision than an engineer's qualifications in some cases.12 (]d-)Roy J. Arrigo admitted in his testimony before ALJ La Jeunesse
that the CPMA, Section 17-33-5(3)(b)(ii), as well as Salt Lake County's Policy
5400, Part 4.0, required that Salt Lake County establish written minimum
qualifications for positions. (Transcript, p. 125). He also admitted that Salt Lake
County had not established any written policy to allow the substitution of the
minimum requirements for EIT, EQE, FE, or PE, or an engineering degree, for
that of a Land Supervisor's License. (Transcript, p. 146). Mr. Arrigo was forced

12

Notwithstanding this testimony, its should be noted that Salt Lake County has an official
surveyor, as permitted by statute, who employs licensed surveyors who perform surveying
functions.
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to admit that Salt Lake County's Personnel Director should have established a
"different set of career ladder criteria" to allow for the substitution of a land
surveyor's license, but failed to do so. (Transcript, p. 153).
3.

Steven Dale. Steven Dale did not hold an engineering

degree. Salt Lake County recruited, through a recruitment notice, the position of
Engineer 24/26 position in Development Services on or about February 13, 1998.
(R. 633). The announcement for a grade 26 required a bachelor's degree in
engineering, EIT, EQE, or a Professional Land Surveyor's license. Steven Dale
was hired 4/27/98 at grade 26.13 (R. p. 632). At the time of his appointment, he
lacked any of these qualifications except a Land Surveyor's License.14
(Transcript, p. 198-198).
4.

Denton Mecham. Mr. Mecham did not hold an engineering

degree. (Transcript, p. 167). He did not have an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE. (Record,
p. 374, Transcript, p. 162). He was initially employed in the Operations Division
of Public Works as a grade 24/26 engineer. (Record, p. 612, 612a, and p. 393).
He was promoted from an engineer 24 to engineer 26 on January 1, 1999.
(Record, p. 394). On January 1, 1999, he was "promoted" to a pavement

Interestingly, the Public Works Department submitted a "Position Description Form" on 1/23/98
that identified Steven Dale as the employee of this position even though the job had not been
posted. (Record, p. 408, Exhibit 22).
14
Roy J. Arrigo, Classification and Compensation Manager for Salt Lake County, testified that he
did not know the difference between a professional land surveyor or a professional engineer but a
land surveyor is generally paid less in the marketplace. (R. 199).
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manager supervisor as a grade 26. (Record, 394). (Transcript, p. 90, 162). He
was not required to apply for the position. (Record, p. 374).15
Salt Lake County attempted to justify Mr. Mecham's position and
grade on the basis that he was in a supervisory position. (Transcript, p. 165).
According to Mr. Arrigo, the actual duties of a supervisor do not require the
minimum qualifications.16 (Transcript, p. 165-167). However, when asked if
there was any policy, rule or regulation that stated supervisors did not have to
meet the minimum qualifications for the position, Roy J. Arrigo, Classification and
Compensation Manager for Salt Lake County testified, "There's no such rule."
(Transcript, p. 166).
5.

Rick Olson. Mr. Olson hefd no engineering degree. He did

hold a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration from the University of
Phoenix and an Associates Degree in Drafting from the Utah Technical College.
(Record, p. 614). He did not hold an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE. (Transcript, p. 168
and Record, p. 374). He started with the Public Works Department in 1979 as a
designer. On March 16, 1980, he became an Engineer 24 in Flood Control of
Public Works. (Record, p. 614). On December 1, 1987, Salt Lake County

15

On December 16, 1999, he applied for and was promoted to the position of Sanitation Director
of the Public Works Department, grade 33. (Record, p. 599).
16
Notwithstanding his testimony, Mr. Mecham's duties as pavement manager supervisor clearly
required engineering functions. See his job description, Record, p. 608-611. He was responsible
for, among other things, "project design and organization of all field data", "engineer estimate and
awarding of contract[s]", development of engineer estimates for highway and maintenance needs,
"train engineering interns and technicians to conduct field surveys", and others. His job
description specifically required, under the "Knowledge" Section, "Engineering principles and
applications for highway design."
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promoted Mr. Olsen from a grade 24 engineer to a grade 26 Permit Supervisor in
the Highway Department. On January 1, 1999, he was promoted as part of a
"reclassification" to Flood Control Supervisor, Grade 28. (Record, p. 616). He
was not required to apply for the position. (Record, p. 374).
6.

Larry Taggart. Larry Taggart did not hold an engineering

degree. Mr. Taggart worked with the Petitioner in the position of a grade 24
engineer in the Flood Control Engineering Division in design. (Record, p. 642).
On December 31, 1998, Mr. Taggart retired after 27 years as an engineer 24.
(Record, p. 640). On August 4,1999, Salt Lake County rehired Mr. Taggart in
the same position as a "temporary" employee but rehired him as a grade 26.
(Record, p. 641). Neil Stack, Salt Lake County's Engineering Director, frankly
testified that they made him a grade 26 "to come back." (Transcript, p. 291).
Although Mr. Taggart is classified as a "temporary" employee, he remains
employed to this day. (Transcript, p. 133-134, 178).
Salt Lake County admitted that Mr. Taggart did not have the
qualifications to be in an engineer grade 26. (Transcript, p. 188). Roy J. Arrigo,
Classification and Compensation Manager for Salt Lake County, testified that
Salt Lake County considered Mr. Taggart's qualifications as "immaterial"
(Record, p. 188) because, according to Salt Lake County, there are no minimum
qualifications for temporary employees. (Record, p. 185). He claimed that this
was an "interpretation" of the County Personnel Management Act. (Record, p.
186). Yet, the CPMA, Section 17-33-5(3)(b)(ix) provides, "temporary, provisional,
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or other non-career service appointments, ... may not be used as a way of
defeating the purpose of the career service and may not exceed 90 days...." On
cross-examination, Mr. Arrigo admitted that Salt Lake County had no express
written policy that exempted temporary employment from meeting the minimum
qualifications for the job.17 (Transcript, p. 186).
7.

Martin Knaphus. Martin Knaphus did not hold an

engineering degree. Mr. Knaphus was employed in the Public Works Flood
Control Division along with the Petitioner in a grade 21 position. In the fall of
1991, Development Services Engineering Subdivision reclassified the position of
Highway Engineering Technician 23 to an Engineer 24-26. (Record, p. 591). Mr.
Knaphus successfully applied for the position and was transferred from Public
Works Flood Control to Development Services effective May 1, 1992, and
became an Engineer 24. (Record, p. 586). Mr. Kanaphus did not have the EIT,
EQE, FE, or PE. (Transcript, p. 155). Like Steven Dale, however, he acquired a
Land Surveyor's License on January 25, 2000. (Record, p. 584). Like Steven
Dale, Salt Lake County then promoted Mr. Kanaphus to a Grade 26 Engineer
effective February 1, 2000, (Record, p. 583, Transcript, p. 156). Salt Lake
County again "reclassified" his position to an Engineer Review Specialist

Salt Lake County, however, requires all "provisional" appointments to meet the minimum
qualifications for the position. (Policy 5100, § 5.2.4). Mr. Arrigo could not explain why provisional
employees would have to meet minimum requirements but temporary employees would not.
(Transcript, p. 267).
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effective April 16, 2000, and promoted him to a grade 28. (Record, p. 581,
Transcript, p. 156).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Petitioner argues that he was the victim of discrimination on the basis
of national origin, or race, when Salt Lake County Public Work's Department
failed to advance him from an entry level engineer position for over 27 years
while, at the same time, advancing less qualified white non-Iranian/Persian
employees. He submits that Salt Lake County's Public Works Department found
ways to manipulate and evade Salt Lake County's career ladder program to
avoid the mandatory minimum qualifications for advancement.
No dispute exists relative to the Petitioner's prima facie case of
discrimination. Instead, the only issue in this case is whether there was
substantial evidence in the record for the Labor Commission Appeal Board to
overrule its own Administrative Law Judge and conclude that Salt Lake County's
articulated reason for not promoting the Petitioner past an entry-level position for
over 27 years, while at the same time advancing white non-Iranian/Persian
males, was not pretextual and was based upon legitimate and lawful nondiscriminatory reasons unrelated to the Petitioner's origin.
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the Appeals Board erred in its
analysis by ignoring the legal standard regarding pretext and ignoring or
marginalizing undisputed evidence of "disturbing" irregularities conducted by Salt
Lake County's Public Works Department in its promotional processes. These
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disturbing irregularities were not technical in nature and were abundant within the
Public Works Department. The discriminatory effect was to leave Mr. Tarkeshian
in his entry level position for his entire career.
The Petitioner seeks a reversal of the Labor Commission Appeals Board
and the reinstatement of the decision of its own Administrative Law Judge that
originally found in Petitioner's favor. He also seeks an award of a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs for this Appeal if he is successful.
ARGUMENT
Point One
THE LABOR COMMISSION APPEALS BOARD ERRED WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY'S PROFFERED LEGITIMATE
NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR NOT ADVANCING THE PETITIONER
WAS NON-PRETEXTUAL AND DID NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER BASED UPON HIS NATIONAL ORIGIN.
A.

INTRODUCTION AND ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES ON
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

By its own words, the Utah Labor Commission "substitute^] its own
judgment" for that of its own administrative law judge. (Record, p. 494, 495).
The only difference between the Appeals Board and its ALJ is that the former
disagreed with the ultimate legal conclusion regarding pretext, i.e., whether Salt
Lake County 's failure to promote the Petitioner for over 27 years, while, at the
same time, promoting seven other less qualified white male employees was nonpretextual and non-discriminatory. (Id-, P- 498). In other words, the Appeals
Board completely condoned or discounted the "so-called disparities in
treatment..." proved by the Petitioner at trial, (jd.)-
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The Petitioner admits that an agency may "substitute its own judgment" for
that of its ALJ, United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d
807, 811 (Utah 1980), and may affirm, modify, or reverse its decision, or remand
for further proceedings. §34A-1 -303(4). However, an agency's ability to
substitute its own ALJ's judgment is not without limits. For example, an agency's
ultimate findings must be supported by substantial evidence, id-, p. 811.
"Substantial evidence" is '"that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Harken v.
Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted).
In supplying the substantial evidence test, the appellate court reviews both
evidence that supports the Board's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from
them. Albertson's v. Department of Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 574 (Ut.
App. 1993). Further, the ultimate findings must be viewed in light of the whole
record before the court. Albertson's, supra, p. 574-575. Lastly, because the Utah
Legislature has not given the Labor Commission authority to interpret Utah's
Anti-Discrimination Act, this Court reviews the Labor Commissions rulings of law
for correctness. Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993, 995 (Ut. App.
2001).
This case is one of alleged discrimination arising under Utah's AntiDiscrimination Act, §34A-5-106 that prohibits discrimination on the basis of,
among other things, race and national origin. Both the ALJ and the Appeals
Board attempted to follow the precedents established by federal courts in
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interpreting and applying federal anti-discrimination laws. (Order Granting
Motion For Review, Record, p. 497). Generally, so do Utah's appellate courts.
For example, see Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, supra, p. 995.
The application of the burden-shifting analysis set forth by McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) is a question of law. Sheikh v.
Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d 1103 (Ut. App. 1995); and, Handy v.
Union Pac. R.R.. 841 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App.1992). When reviewing an
agency's conclusion regarding a question of law, appellate courts accord the
agency decision no deference, but review it for correctness. Sheikh v.
Department of Public Safety, supra; Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm'n, 811
P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991); Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n. 897 P.2d 352, 354
(Utah App.1995).
Here, both the ALJ and the Appeals Board followed the "burden-shifting"
analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Under the burden-shifting
analysis, a party claiming discrimination first has the burden of demonstrating a
prima-facie case. Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety, supra, p. 1106.
Second, once completed, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a
non-discriminatory reason for its suspect actions, (id.). Third, if the employer
does so, then the burden re-shifts to the complainant to demonstrate that the
employer's alleged non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. (id.)- The ultimate
burden of persuasion that the employer discriminated against the employee "
'remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" University of Utah v. Industrial
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Commission, 736 P.2d 630, 635 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 LEd.2d 207 (1981).
Here, again, both the ALJ and the Appeals Court concluded that the
Petitioner presented a prima facie case. (Order Granting Motion For Review,
Record, p. 498). They both agreed that Salt Lake County offered an explanation
for its suspect actions, (jd-)- However, the ALJ and the Appeals Court differed
on the third analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: whether the
Respondent's explanation for its actions were pretextual.
For the reason's set forth below, the Petitioner alleges the Labor
Commission Appeal Board's ultimate factual and legal conclusion, that Salt Lake
County's explanation for not promoting the Petitioner was not pretextual, is not
supported by substantial evidence taking the record as a whole and applying the
correct standard of law regarding pretext. Albertson's v. Department of
Employment Sec, supra. It wrongfully substituted its judgment for that of its own
ALJ.
The Petitioner respectfully submits that, under the law governing pre-text
in the federal system, to be applied in the instant case, there is only one
conclusion: that Salt Lake County's alleged exceptions to the law and
irregularities regarding promotions allowed a subtle form of discrimination to
occur that left the Petitioner in an entry level position for his entire employment
with Salt Lake County.
B.

LEGAL STANDARD TO BE APPLIED REGARDING PRETEXT.
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The Petitioner respectfully maintains that the Labor Commission Appeals
Board employed the wrong legal standard in determining pretext. This Court has
not addressed how an employee may demonstrate pretext, or what evidence
may be considered. However, other courts have done so while addressing
federal anti-discrimination laws and this Court often follows such decisions.
Victron/Lika, supra.
The law in the Tenth Circuit is well settled that an employee may show
pretext by "'prior treatment of plaintiff; the employer's policy and practice
regarding minority employment (including statistical data); disturbing procedural
irregularities (e.g. falsifying or manipulating...criteria; and the use of subjective
criteria.'" Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 305 F.3d 1210, 1218, 89 Fair
Empl.Prac.Case (BNA) 1675, 83 Empl. Prac.Dec. P41.291 (10th Cir.
2002)(citations omitted).18 Pretext need not be shown by direct evidence (racist
comments, ageist drawings or the like) and may be demonstrated by
circumstantial evidence alone. (]d, ft. 5, p. 1218). As the Court noted in Garrett,
supra, p. 1218, ft. 5, "Indeed, the burden-shifting structure, involving prong three,
pretext, is precisely the means by which a plaintiff may prove discrimination with
circumstantial rather than direct evidence."

Citing specific cases, the Garrett court explained at p. 1218 that, "Courts view with
skepticism subjective evaluation methods...." (Citation omitted). "[Subjective promotion
procedures are to be closely scrutinized because of their susceptibility to discriminatory abuse."
(Citation omitted).

Tarkeshian Brief ***page 30

In Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401, 30 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas.
(BNA) 13115 (10th Cir. 1983), a case arising from Utah involving the promotion of
a engineer, the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court decision following a bench
trial and held that an inference of pretext existed sufficient to rebut the
employer's alleged non-discriminatory explanation for its suspect action where
the employer had "serious procedural irregularities" in its promotional processes.
In Mohammed, the procedural irregularity was the employer's failure to convene
an ad hoc committee to interview applicants and the decision to promote was
based upon the mere review of personnel files.
In Muller v. United States Steel Corporation, 509 F.2d 923, 10 Fair
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 323, 9 Empl.Prac.Dec. p. 9901 (10th Cir. 1975), involving
another Utah promotion case, the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's decision
following a bench trial and ruled that statistics could be used to demonstrate
pretext. In Muller, the plaintiff showed that, though employed for fourteen years,
he had not been chosen to be a spell foreman, a criterion used to become a turn
foreman. The Muller Court also ruled that the application of "vague and
inconclusive criteria" and the lack of "meaningful standards" in promotion
decisions supported pretext. Muller, supra, p. 927. The Muller Court specifically
rejected the employer's argument that a specific intent to discriminate had to
exist:
"The law is clear that a plaintiff in a job discrimination case need not
prove that the employer had a specific intent to discriminate. It is sufficient
that the employer's conduct produced discriminatory results." (id.)-
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In DoDoo v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 235 F.3d 522, 84 Fair
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 933, 79 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,357, 2001 CJ C A R . 184
(10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit upheld a jury trial and jury instructions
involving a failure to promote. In DoDoo, the plaintiff showed prextext by a
"highly irregular" procedure where the employer promoted a non-minority ahead
of the plaintiff in violation of the company's rule that one must be employed for at
least a year before being considered for promotion.
The Tenth Circuit has likewise reversed district court decisions following
summary judgment in favor of the employer where the employee demonstrated
pretext by irregular procedures in the promotion process. In Doebele v.
Sprint/United Management Co., 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit
reversed a Kansas District Court's ruling on pretext where the employee showed
the employer's decision not to promote, and ultimately terminate the plaintiff, was
shown to be documented by the employer "after the fact" to justify decisions
already made by the employer. Likewise, in Beaird v. Seagate Technology, Inc.,
145 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1998), the Tenth Circuit reversed an Oklahoma district
court's ruling on pretext where the employee demonstrated the employer used
"potential" as a criteria for promotion in violation of its own policies.
In the present case, the Appeals Board did not employ the legal standards
as expressed by the above decisions in deciding the issue of pretext. In fact, the
Appeals Board did not discuss it at all. Instead, the Appeals Board wanted what

Tarkeshian Brief ***page 32

is not required to prove pretext, i.e., evidence of direct discrimination.19 Garrett,
supra, p. 1218. Moreover, it condoned and marginalized the Plaintiffs
undisputed evidence of these serious promotional irregularities by simply stating
that the "County could have done a better job of conforming its written policies to
its actual practices...." (Record, p. 498). And contrary to the Appeals Board's
strange conclusion regarding the nationality of his co-workers20, it was
undisputed at the hearing before ALJ La Jeunesse that all of the employees
discussed in relation to this case were all white, non-minorities, except the
Petitioner who was of Persian/Iranian origin, as Judge La Jeunesse noted.
(Record, p. 420).
C.

APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD REGARDING
PRETEXT TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

The Petitioner's evidence on pretext is amply supported by the record. In
summary this evidence consisted of the following:
A.

The Petitioner, of Persian/Iranian national origin, has

remained in an entry level position for over twenty-seven years without
promotion.
B.

He is the only person in his department who has not been

promoted.

The Appeals Board stated in its ruling, "He has identified no instances during that time [twentyfive years of employment] any conflict or comment from co-worker, supervisor or manager related
to his national origin." (Record, p. 498)(Explanation added).
20
The Appeals Board stated in its ruling, "Furthermore, Mr. Tarkeshian has presented no
evidence regarding the national origin of his co-workers and supervisors." (Record, p. 498).
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C.

During the same period of time, seven less qualified white,

non-minority, employees were promoted in the Public Works Department through
admitted irregularities, if not outright violations of the law.
The first two facts were not disputed below and are unlikely to be disputed
on appeal. Therefore, the Petitioner will focus the balance of his argument on
the irregularities or the "exceptions to the rule" claimed by Salt Lake County in
justifying the promotion of these seven employees to the exclusion of the
Petitioner. This is important because ALJ La Jeunesse viewed "the exceptions
articulated by Salt Lake County in promoting white, non-Arabic, non-Peersian
engineers "...as pretexts to mask a subtle discrimination against Mr.
Tarkeshian..." (Record, p. 420), whereas the Appeals Board condoned or
marginalized Salt Lake County's violations of its own career ladder rules as being
both reasonable and non-discriminatory. (Record, p. 498-499).
First, the irregularities that permeated Salt Lake County's career-ladder
promotional processes must be classified as "disturbing" or "highly" irregular and
not mere technicalities. Garrett, supra. The undisputed facts in this case rise to
that level. Here, Utah State Law mandates that counties, including Salt Lake
County, establish the minimum qualifications "for appointment or promotion."
CPMA, § 17-33-5(3)(b)(ii). In addition, Salt Lake County's own policy, Policy
5400, Part 4.0, requires that the minimum qualifications be set forth in writing. In
conformity with the above statute and policy, Salt Lake County established
minimum qualifications for career-ladder appointments and promotions of all
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engineers by the publication of its April 1, 1980, Policy (Addendum G) and its
March 16, 2000, Policy (Addendum H) that required either the EIT, or EQE, or
FE, to advance from an entry level position. These policies did not allow Salt
Lake County's Public Works Department to substitute any of these minimum
qualifications for a Land Surveyor's License.
Yet, the Public Works Department allowed all seven white employees to
be advanced, at one time or another, on the basis they held a surveyor's license,
even thought they had never held an engineering degree and had never taken
the EQE, EIT, or FE. All seven appointments violated the County's own written
policies as well as Utah State Law.
Salt Lake County also attempted to defend the promotions of the seven
white employees on the basis that some became supervisors. Salt Lake County
alleged that its supervisors really did not need to meet the minimum
qualifications. It takes "Chutzpa" for Salt Lake County to advocate that its
supervisory engineers did not need to meet the minimum qualifications in order
to supervise those who perform the actual engineering services! How in the
world can they possibly be effective supervisors if they do not have the basic
engineering knowledge required of their subordinates? Moreover, as admitted by
Mr. Arrigo, there is no provision in Salt Lake County's written policies and
procedures that suggest an engineer may be promoted or advanced to a
supervisory position without the minimum qualifications.
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Salt Lake County also attempted to justify its failure to follow its own
written policies regarding promotion, regarding one of the seven white
employees, Mr. Taggart, on the basis his was only a "temporary" appointment
and that temporary appointments did not need to meet the minimum
qualifications required for that position. As the court may recall, Mr. Taggart
worked side-by-side with the Petitioner as an engineer 24 until December 31,
1998, when Mr. Taggart retired. (Record, p. 640). Shortly thereafter, Salt Lake
County rehired Mr. Taggart in the same position as a "temporary" employee but
rehired him in a grade 26. (Record, p. 641). Although Mr. Taggart is classified
as a "temporary" employee, he remains employed to this day. (Transcript, p.
133-134, 178).
In response, the Petitioner demonstrated below that under State law,
CPMA, § 17-33-5(3)(ix), "temporary, provisional, or other non-career service
appointments"..."may not be used as a way of defeating the purpose of career
service and may not exceed 90 days...." At trial before ALJ La Jeunesse, Mr.
Arrigo was forced to admit that Salt Lake County had no express written policy
that exempted temporary employment from meeting the minimum qualifications
for the job. (Transcript, p. 186).
Second, Salt Lake County's "so-called" exceptions to Utah State Law and
its own written policies only benefited less qualified, white, non-Iranian/Persian,
employees. As found by ALJ La Jeunesse,
"It is incomprehensible that Mr. Tarkeshian who in many cases had more
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experience and education than those promoted over him sat in an entry
level engineering position for 26 years while Salt Lake County found '
various and sundry exceptions to written rules in order to promote white,
non-Iranian/Persian males. Salt Lake County always seemed able to find
an exception to the rules that bound Mr. Tarkeshian to an entry level
position in order to promote everyone but Mr. Tarkeshian." (Record, p.
420).
The Petitioner respectfully maintains that the undisputed evidence in this
case demonstrates that Salt Lake County's articulated alleged non-discriminatory
reason for not advancing the Petitioner, while advancing the other white
employees, was pure pretext. Garrett, supra. There is no substantial evidence
to sustain the Labor Commission Appeal Board's conclusion that the promotion
of these seven employees, leaving the Petitioner in an entry level position for
over 27 years, was based upon legitimate non-discriminatory reasons. Frankly, it
is inconceivable that the Appeals Board could condone violations of the County
Personnel Management Act, as well as Salt Lake County's own merit system,
that were passed to advance merit principles and prohibit the very thing that
occurred in this case. Salt Lake County's Public Works Department used, or
abused, Salt Lake County's career-ladder system to exclude the Petitioner from
promotions. When it comes to prextext in the promotional process, "It is
sufficient that the employer's conduct produced discriminatory results." Mullen
supra, p. 927.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Petitioner respectfully urges the Court to reverse the decision of the
Labor Commission Appeals Board and to reinstate the decision of its ALJ La
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Jeunesse. The Petitioner also respectfully urges the Court to award the
Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee and costs to be determined appropriately
on remand.
Dated this 3tK day of January, 2005.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
SI 'El 'I II. N W • :uuK, being duly sworn, says:
That he is the attorney for Petitioner/Appellant herein; and that he served
the attached APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL upon:
Valerie M. Wilde
Salt Lake County Deputy Attorney
2001 South State Street, Suite 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Alan Hennebold, USB # 4740
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail
at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the ^ 5 d a y of January, 2005.
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STEPHEN W. COOK
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ADDENDUM A:

La JEUNESSE DECISION
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Case No. 8000083

MOSTAFA (JIM) TARKESHIAN,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT „

*

Petitioner,

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

*

vs.
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ORDER

*

SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC
WORKS,

*
*
*

Respondent,

Judge: Richard
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HEARING:
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APPEARANCES i

Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on April 14, 2003 at 8:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.
friend

J junesse, Administrative Law Judge.

The petitioner, Mostafa (Jim) Tarkeshian, was present and represented by
his attorney Ashley Jolly.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner, Jim Tarkeshian, filed an "Charge of Discrimination" with the Utah
Antidiscrimination and Labor Division (UALD) on November 16, 1999 and claimed that Salt
Lake County Public Works (Salt Lake County) discriminated against him in Violation of Utah
Code § 34A-5-106. Mr. Tarkeshian asserted that Salt Lake County failed to promote him in his
employment as a civil engineer because of his race, Arabic, his national origin, Iranian/Persian,
his color, brown, and his age, over forty. At the hearing, Mr. Tarkeshian also claimed that Salt
Lake County retaliated against him because he filed the "Charge of Discrimination." Salt Lake
County generally denied the allegations of discriminatory conduct.
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II. ISSUES.
1.

Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian i
because of his national origin, Iranian/Persian?
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Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian in his position as a civil engineer
because of his race, Arabic?
Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian in his position as a civil engineer
because of his color, brown?

4.

Did Salt Lake County fail to proi;
because of his age over forty?
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Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian in his position as a civil engineer in
retaliation for his filing of a Charge of Discrimination?
HI. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
The petitioner, Jim Tarkeshian, filed an "Charge of Discrimination" with the Utah
Antidiscrimination and Labor Division on November 16, 1999. On November 14, 2001 UALD
issued a Determination and Order and found no cause to support Mr. Tarkeshian's claim. On
December 14, 2001 Mr. Tarkeshian filed a Notice of Appeal and Request for Formal Evidentiary
Hearing with respect to UALD's Determination and Order.
On August 22, 2002 Salt Lake County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which claimed a
right to judgment as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts in this case. Mr. Tarkeshian
filed a Memorandum in Opposition of Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 2, 2002 I
issued a Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgement wherein I denied the motion. I held a de
novo evidentiary hearing in this matter on April 14, 2003.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
Mr. I arkesliian began his employment with Salt Lake County as a grade 24 engineer on January
18, 1977. Mr. Tarkeshian born on September 23, 1940, was 36 years old when hired by Salt
Lake County. Mr. Tarkeshian worked for Salt Lake County as a civil engineer for over twentysix years from 1977, through the date of the hearing. In the twenty-six plus years he worked as
an engineer, Salt Lake County never promoted Mr. Tarkeshian beyond the entrance level for
engineers.
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Salt Lake County asserted that engineers operated under a "career ladder" system of promotion
where after one year service Salt Lake County promoted engineers to the next grade based on the
engineer's passing the EIT1, EQE2, FE\ or proof of a PE4 license. Salt Lake County refused to
promote Mr. Tarkeshian because he failed to pass either the EIT, EQE, or FE, and never obtained
a PE license.
Mr. 1 arkeshian obtamed Bachelor of Science degrees in both Civil Engineering and Mathematics
from the University of Idaho. [Exhibit "P-l"]. Mr. Tarkeshian also obtained a diploma in
Industrial Drafting from National Technical Schools of Los Angeles, California, [id.].
In 1979 Mr. Tarkeshian applied for a position as an engineer grade 26 in the Salt Lake County
Flood Control Division. [Exhibit "P-2"]. Mr. Tarkeshian did not obtain the grade 26 position
with Flood Control, [id.]. In a letter to Mr. Tarkeshian dated November 23, 1979, Salt Lake
County told him that the county elected not to fill the position, [id.]. Salt Lake County did
actually fill the grade 26 position with an internal promotion, [see: Exhibit "P-4"].
On October 31, 1980 Mr. Tarkeshian filed a grievance based on Salt Lake County's failure to
promote him to the grade 26 position. [Exhibit "P-4" and Exhibit "P-5"]. On December 16, 1980
Donald Spencer, the Director of Salt Lake County Public Works, held a hearing on Mr.
Tarkeshian's grievance. [Exhibit "P-4"]. On December 17, 1980 Mr. Spencer issued his decision
resultant from the hearing, [id.]. Mr. Spencer stated that:
Selection on the register was canceled at my direction, as well as additional
consideration for promotion in the Engineering Division pending the
establishment of career paths and identifying formal criteria for the measurement
of competency and justification for promotion. Subsequently, the Personnel
Department approved a career path program for Civil Engineers Grade 24-28.
Since the establishment of the career ladder program for promotion, several
promotions have been accomplished in accordance with career ladder
requirements. At the present time, you have not passed the Engineering in

Engineer in Training.
Engineering Qualification Examination.
-^Fundamentals of Engineering.
Professional Engineer.
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Training Examination or the Utah State Engineering Qualification Examination
and are therefore, not eligible for promotion under the career ladder, [id. at
pages 1-2 f 2][emphasis added].
In short, Mr. Spencer maintained that Salt Lake County canceled the 1979 job announcement for
a grade 26 engineer in Flood Control in order to implement the EIT and EQE requirements
contained in the career ladder. In a confusing about face Mr. Spencer then disclosed that Salt
Lake County actually promoted an engineer by grandfathering Brent Tidwell into a grade 27
u
[w]ith full knowledge of career ladder requirements and position responsibilities." [id. page 2 f
4]. Yet no dispute existed that Brent Tidwell never passed the EIT and/or EQE so important to
Mr. Spencer when he allegedly canceled the job announcement for the grade 26 engineer position
in anticipation of the career ladder standards.
On April 1, 1980 Salt Lake County first implemented the policy that required engineers to
[p]ass the EIT or EQE to be eligible for promotion to grade 26." [Exhibit "P-3"]. In other
words, Salt Lake County set the career ladder policies at issue some four months after denying
Mr. Tarkeshian promotion, yet grandfathered Brent Tidwell into a grade 27 outside the career
ladder requirements. The April 1, 1980 policy specifically stated:
u

All county Engineers assigned to the grade 24, 26, 28 career ladder must pass the
EQE or the EIT to be eligible for promotion to grade 26. [id.][emphasis added].
Roy Arrigo, the Salt Lake County Classification and Compensation Manager testified that Salt
Lake County had no written policy that established exceptions to the minimum requirements of
successful passage of either EIT or EQE for promotion of engineers from grade 24 to grade 26.
In particular, Salt Lake County had no written policy that allowed substitution of another
certification such as a Professional Land Surveyor's License in lieu of successful completioi i I
either the EIT, EQE, or eventually the F.E. and/or P.E.
Mr. Tarkeshian appealed Mr. Spencer's December 17, 1980 decision. On February 10, 1981 the
Merit Council for Salt Lake City issued "Findings and Conclusions and Order" (1981 Order).
The 1981 Order concluded:
Progression within the ladder to an Engineer 26 position required the applicant to
possess the EIT certificate or pass the EQE. [1981 Order page 2^3].
Like Mr. Spencer, the Merit Counsel excepted Brent Tidwell and found:
9

i here does exist in the Engineering Division of Salt Lake County one
example of an employee who holds an Engineer 27 position, but who does
not possess the EIT certificate nor has passed the EQE.
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Said Engineer 27 position consists mostly of supervisory and
administrative responsibility, and does not hold engineering responsibility
beyond the expertise required for an Engineer 24 position.
Said employee held that position prior to the time the EIT and EQE
equirements were made part of the engineer career ladder, and thus said
employee was left in that position in a 'grandfather' status.

12.

Said employee continues in that position as an Engineer 27, while the
position is actually available for an Engineer 30; thus, due to his lack of
the EIT or EQE, said employee is underfilling the position.

ij .

If and when said employee leaves the position, it must be filled by an
engineer who is qualified according to the career ladder to possess not
only the EIT certificate, or pass the EQE, but must also hold a Professional
Engineer (PE) license, [id. at page 3].

On one hand the 1981 Order found that progression of engineers beyond a grade 24 required
either passage of the EIT or EQE. Yet, the 1981 Order then seemed to excuse failure to pass the
EIT or EQE by Mr. Tidwell because of his supervisory status. Then in an another about face, the
1981 Order mandated that anyone replacing Mr. Tidwell in his grandfathered status must not
only pass either the EIT, or the EQE, but must also have the PE license. No where in Salt Lake
County written policy did the career ladder except supervisors from the EIT and/or EQE
requirements. In deed, the 1981 Order mandated possession of the EIT, or EQE, in addition to
the PE license for future supervisors who replaced Brent Tidwell. [id. at page 3 f 1 ^
Despite the edict contained in the 1981 Order, on February 1, 19985 Salt Lake County promoted
Reid Demman from an engineer grade 24 into Mr. Tidwell's position as an Engineer Section
Manager grade 30. [ Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Demman had a Professional Land Surveyor License,
but lacked a PE license6 license and/or qualifying results from either the EIT or EQE tests, [id.].
Before his promotion to a grade 30 engineering manager, Mr. Demman had no managerial or
supervisory experience, [id.].

5

Noted here is the fact that all of the employee actions hereafter complained of by Mr.
Tarkeshian took place after he turned 40 years of age. None of the evidence provided by the
parties indicated Mr. Demman's age at the time of his promotion.
5

Neal Stack, Director of the Salt Lake County Engineering Division, testified that a grade
30 required a PE license because the grade 30 engineer signed off on design plans.
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On December 1,1987 Salt Lake County promoted Ricky Olsen from a grade 24 engineer to a
grade 26 Permit Supervisor in the Highway Department. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Ricky Olsen not only
lacked any of the EIT, EQE, FE, and/or PE certifications, he also lacked a B.S. in Engineering,
[id.]. Mr. Arrigo claimed that supervisors do not function as engineers. Ergo, Mr. Arrigo
maintained that Mr. Olsen required none of the EIT, EQE, FE, PE certifications, nor a B.S. in
Engineering. On January 1, 1990 Mr. Olsen became the Permit Supervisor in Public Works
Engineering still at a grade 26. [id.].
In the meantime, Salt Lake County issued several announcements for engineers with varying and
inconsistent minimum qualifications listed. In 1992 Salt Lake County issued a job
announcement for an "ENGINEER 26" in the Development Services Division with a closing date
of September 18, 1992 (the 1992 bulletin). [Exhibit "R-4"]. The 1992 bulletin set forth
minimum qualifications as:
Education and Experience
a.

Graduation from an accredited college of (sic) university with a
bachelor's degree in Civil Engineering plus two (2) years of
experience in a field closely related to these duties and an
Engineer-in-Training Certificate or passage of the Utah State
Engineer Qualifying Examination; OR
Eight (8) years of experience in a field closely related to these
duties for the required college study plus Engineer-in-Training
Certificate or passage of the Utah State Engineer Qualifying
Examination; OR

b.

An equivalent combination of education and experience
College study in a closely related field may be substituted for up to
two (2) years of the eight (8) years of required related experience.

ndi.
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The 1992 bulletin created an ambiguity that could be read in two conflicting ways. At first blush
the 1992 bulletin seemed to conform to the April 1, 1980 policy announcement set forth in
Exhibit "P-3" that an engineer grade 26 required passage of the EIT, or EQE, in addition to a
Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering and two years related experience, [id.]. The 1992
bulletin allowed certain substitutions of experience for education, [id.]. However, subparagraph
"b" prefaced by "OR" could be read to mean that education and experience served as an
acceptable substitute for all the requirements in subparagraph "a."[id.]. No where does the 1992
bulletin state that a Professional Land Surveyor's License could be substituted for passage of the
EIT, or EQE.
Acceptance of the later interpretation of the 1992 bulletin meant that Mr. Tarkeshian who at that
time had 15 years experience in the Salt Lake County Engineering Division, together with a B.S.
in Civil Engineering, should not have been denied advancement to a grade 26 engineer.
Acceptance of the first interpretation of the 1992 bulletin left Salt Lake County without an
acceptable excuse for the promotions of Mr. Tidwell and particularly Mr. Demman.
Salt Lake County issued a job announcement for an "ENGINEER 24/26" in the Development
Services Division with a closing date of December 29, 1997 (The 1997 bulletin). [Exhibit "Pfi"l The 1997 bulletin set forth minimum qualifications identical to those in the 1992 bulletin.
In 1998 Salt Lake County issued a job announcement for an "ENGINEER 24/26,, in the
Development Services Division with a closing date of February 13, 1998 (The Februaryl998
bulletin). [Exhibit "R-4"]. The February 1998 bulletin set forth minimum qualifications
identical to those in the 1992 and 1997 bulletins except, the February 1998.bulletin allowed for
the first time a substitution of the Professional land Surveyor's license in lieu of the EIT, or EQE
requirements.
The "Notice of Personnel Action" contained in the records of Salt Lake County showed that it
hired Steven Dale as a grade 26 engineer effective April 27,1998. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Arrigo
acknowledged and Salt Lake County's own records showed that it hired Steven Dale off of the
February 1998 bulletin, [id.]. Yet, a Salt Lake County Position Description Form demonstrated
that effective February 1, 1998 Mr. Dale accepted the grade 26 position some 12 days before the
closing date set forth in the job announcement bulletin, [id.]. Mr. Dale had a Professional land
Surveyor's License but never passed the EIT, or EQE. As with Mr. Tidwell, Mr. Demman, and
Mr. Olsen, irregularities and exceptions to normal written requirements abounded in Salt Lake
County's hiring of Mr. Dale as a grade 26 engineer.
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On December 31, 1998 Larry Taggert retired from Salt Lake County as a grade 24 engineer.
[Exhibit "P-18"]. On August 4, 1999 Salt Lake County re-hired Larry Taggert as a grade 26
engineer instead of at the grade 24 entry level then in effect. [Exhibit "P-20"]. Mr. Taggert never
met the requirements of the EIT, EQE, FE or PE. [Exhibit-"R-3"]. Mr. Anigo maintained that
because Salt Lake County re-hired Mr. Taggert as a temporary employee at a grade 26, no
requirement existed for him to meet the requirements of the EIT, EQE, FE or PE. However, Mr.
Arrigo admitted that nothing existed in written Salt Lake County policies that excused grade 26
engineers from passage of either the EIT, EQE, FE, or PE because of a temporary employment
classification. Neal Stack frankly acknowledged that Salt Lake County offered Mr. Taggert a
grade 26 so that he would accept an offer to come back to work for Salt Lake County. Mr.
Taggert remained a temporary employee from August 24, 1999, through the date of the hearing,
some two and a half years later.
On January 1,1999 Salt Lake County promoted Ricky Olsen from a grade 247 engineer to a
Flood Control Supervisor Grade 28 in the Flood Control Engineering Division. [Exhibit "R-3"].
Mr. Olsen still had nothing by way of certification in the EIT, EQE, FE, PE, nor a B.S. Degree in
Engineering.
Also on January 1, 1999 Salt Lake County reclassified Denton Mecham from a grade 24 engineer
to a grade 26 Pavement Manager. [Exhibit "P-17"]. Then, on December 16, 1999 Salt Lake
County promoted Mr. Mecham outside the Engineering Division to Sanitation Division Director
at a grade 33. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Mecham lacked a PE license and/or qualifying results from
either the EIT, EQE or FE tests, [id.]. Mr. Arrigo again claimed that neither the Pavement
Management Supervisor, nor the Sanitation Division Director, required a PE license and/or
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests.
On February 1, 2000 Salt Lake County utilized the "career ladder" to move Martin Knapus from
a grade 24 engineer to a grade 26 engineer. [ Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Arrigo argued that because Mr.
Knapus obtained a Professional Land Surveyor's License he met the "Career Ladder" criteria for
automatic promotion to a grade 26 engineer. Yet, Mr. Knapus lacked a PE license and/or
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests.
On March 16, 2000 Salt Lake Public Works Department requested approval from the Personnel
Department to restructure the career ladder in that the entry level position moved from a grade 24
to a grade 26, the grade 26 became a grade 28, and the grade 28 became a grade 30. [Exhibit P11"]. The request specifically stated:
7

Mr. Olsen caught in a Reduction in Force action at Salt Lake County went back to an
engineer grade 24 on May 1, 1991.
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We respectfully request approval of the Career Ladder Plan as written for the
Engineer 26/28/30 position. As you know, we have this classification in three
Public Works divisions, Flood Control, Engineering, and Planning/Development
Services.
The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 26 to the 28 level are as
follows:
1.
2.
3.

The employee has worked for one year as a grade 26.
The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year as
shown by receiving a performance evaluation with satisfactory rating.
The employee has received their Fundamentals of Engineering (FE)8
certification by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering.

The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 28 to the 30 level are as
follows:
1.
2.

3.

The employee has worked for one year as a grade 28.
The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the
year as shown by receiving a performance evaluation with
satisfactory rating.
The employee has received their Professional Engineer (PE)
License in the State of Utah. [id.].

Of note the reclassification Memo of March 16, 2000 applied to three Divisions that employed
engineers i.e. Pubhc Works divisions, Flood Control, Engineering, and Planning/Development
Services. Importantly, the reclassification memo mentioned nothing about substituting the
Professional Land Surveyor's License for the FE. Further, the reclassification memo made no
exception for supervisors in the respective divisions affected by the reclassifications.
Mr. Arrigo stated that Salt Lake County approved the reclassification proposal set forth in
Exhibit "P-l 1" on May 1, 2000. [see: Exhibit "R-7"]. A Recruitment Announcement issued after
approval of the reclassification of the Career ladder set forth the minimum qualifications for a
grade 28 (the new grade 26):

8

The parties agreed that successful completion of the EIT or EQE satisfied the FE
requirement.
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Graduation from an accredited college or university with a bachelor's degree in
Civil Engineering plus one (1) year of experience in a field closely related to these
duties and the Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) Certification or equivalent.
[Exhibit "R-4"].
The Recruitment Announcement after the reclassification said nothing about substituting the
Professional Land Surveyor's License for the FE. [id.]. Also, the Recruitment Announcement
made no exception for supervisors in the respective divisions affected by the reclassifications.
On April 16, 2000 Salt Lake County reclassified Martin Knapus from a grade 26 to a grade 28
pursuant to the reclassification of the Career Ladder. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Knapus' promotion to
a grade 28 engineer took place two weeks before the actual effective date of the general
reclassification on May 1, 2000. [Exhibit "R-7"]. Again, Mr. Knapus lacked a PE license and/or
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests.
No dispute existed that all of the employees discussed in relation to this action except Mr.
Tarkeshian were white, non-Arabic, and not of Persian/Iranian national origins. No dispute
existed that at least six white males including Mr. Demman, Mr. Knapus, Mr. Mecham, Mr.
Olsen, Mr. Dale, and Mr. Taggert received promotions from entry level engineers to grades
higher than Mr. Tarkeshian who himself remained at the entry level for an engineer during his 26
plus year career with Salt Lake County.
None of the six white males promoted from entry level engineers to higher grades over Mr.
Tarkeshian obtained a PE license and/or qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE, or FE tests
as required by Salt Lake County's written policies. Salt Lake County argued exceptions applied
for each promotion of the six white males who lacked a PE license and/or qualifying results
from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests. The preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed
that the exceptions articulated by Salt Lake County in promoting white, non-Arabic, non-Persian
engineers merely served as pretexts to mask a subtle discrimination against Mr. Tarkeshian in
violation of Utah Code § 34A-5-106.9 It is incomprehensible that Mr. Tarkeshian who in many
cases had more experience and education than those promoted over him sat in an entry level
engineering position for 26 years while Salt Lake County found various and sundry exceptions to
the written rules in order to promote white, non-arabic, non-Iranian/Persian males. Salt Lake
County always seemed able to find an exception to the rules that bound Mr. Tarkeshian to an
entry level position in order to promote everyone but Mr. Tarkeshian.
9

Because I found direct discrimination by Salt Lake County against Mr. Tarkeshian
based on race, national origin, and color, I do not reach the issues of retaliation. Mr. Tarkeshian
presented no evidence to support his claim of age discrimination.
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After reclassification of the "career ladder" levels from 24-26, to 26-28, on May 1, 2000, all
entry level engineers including Mr. Tarkeshian moved from a 24 to a 26 grade. However Mr.
Tarkeshian lost the benefit of earlier promotion.
Salt Lake County should be compelled to promote Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 26 engineer
effective November 13, 197910, until April 16, 200011 at which date Salt Lake County should
reclassify Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 28 engineer. Salt Lake County should reimburse Mr.
Tarkeshian for the difference in the pay he actually received for the time period November 13,
1979, until the date of this Order, and the pay he would have received pursuant to the promotions
ordered herein.
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Utah Code § 34A-5-106(1) states in relevant part that:
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
(a)(i) For an employer to refuse to... promote...or discriminate in matters of
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any
persons otherwise qualified, because of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(G) national origin
Mr. Tarkeshian belonged to a protected class as an Arabic man of Iranian/Persian national origin
and brown skin color. During the times relevant to this action, Mr. Tarkeshian had Bachelor of
Science degrees in both Civil Engineering and Mathematics. Mr. Tarkeshian also had a diploma
in Industrial Drafting from National Technical Schools of Los Angeles, California. When denied
his first promotion in November 1979 Mr. Tarkeshian had two years experience in Salt Lake
County's Engineering Division together with other experience in the engineering field. Absent
the exceptions made by Salt Lake County for white, non-Arabic, non Iranian/Persian, engineers,
Mr. Tarkeshian qualified for promotion from the entry level engineer grade to the next grade
level in the Career Ladder for engineers the same as others promoted over him.

10

The date Salt Lake County first denied Mr. Tarkeshian promotion to the grade 26.

11

The first date evidenced in this case that an engineer received reclassification
promotion from grade 26 to 28. (i.e. Martin Knapus).
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In summary, Salt Lake County discriminated against Mr. Tarkeshian based on his race, Arabic,
National Origin, Iranian/Persian, and color, brown. The exceptions articulated by Salt Lake
County in promoting white, non-Arabic, non-Persian engineers merely served as pretexts to
mask a subtle discrimination against Mr. Tarkeshian in violation of Utah Code § 34A-5-106.
Salt Lake County must promote Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 26 engineer effective November 13,
1979, until April 16, 2000, at which date Salt Lake County must reclassify Mr. Tarkeshian to a
grade 28 engineer. Salt Lake County must reimburse Mr. Tarkeshian for the difference in the
pay he actually received for the time period November 13, 1979, until the date of this Order, and
the pay he would have received pursuant to the promotions ordered herein.
VI. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Salt Lake County shall promote Mr. Tarkeshian to a
grade 26 engineer effective November 13, 1979, until April 16,2000, at which date Salt Lake
County shall reclassify Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 28 engineer. Salt Lake County shall
reimburse Mr. Tarkeshian for the difference in the pay he actually received for the time period
November 13, 1979, until the date of this Order, and the pay he would have received pursuant to
the promotions ordered herein together with interest at eight percent (8%).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salt Lake County shall cease all discriminatory practices
toward Mostafa Tarkeshian.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than October 22, 2003, Mostafa Tarkeshian's
attorney, Ashley Jolly, shall file an affidavit setting forth in detail his attorneys' fees relevant to
this matter. The respondents shall no later than November 3, 2003, file objections, if any, with
respect to Ashley Jolly's attorneys' fees affidavit. Thereafter, I will issue a supplemental Order
with respect to attorneys' fees in this matter.
Dated this 9th day of October 2003,

Richard M. La Jeunesse
.dministrative Law Judge
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the'specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

MOSTAFA (JIM) TARKESHIAN,
Applicant,

*
*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

v.

*
*

SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS, *
Defendant.

Case No. 8-00-0083

*
*

Salt Lake County asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review
Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse's determination that the County violated the Utah
Antidiscrimination Act (Title 34A, Chapter 5, Utah Code Annotated; ("the Act" hereafter) by
engaging in unlawful employment discrimination against Mostafa Tarkeshian.
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-107(l 1).

BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On November 16,1999, Mr. Tarkeshian filed a complaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination
and Labor Division ("UALD") alleging the County had refused to promote him because of his
national origin, race, color and age, thereby violating the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. UALD
investigated the complaint but found no violation of the Act. Mr. Tarkeshian then requested a formal
de novo evidentiary hearing on his complaint as allowed by §34A-5-107(4)(c) of the Act.
Judge La Jeunesse conducted the evidentiary hearing on April 14,2003. During the course of
the hearing, Mr. Tarkeshian limited his charges against the County to discrimination based on
national origin and retaliation. On October 9, 2003, Judge La Jeunesse ruled that the County had
unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Tarkeshian.
In seeking Appeals Board review of this matter, the County challenges Judge La Jeunesse's
findings of fact and his ultimate conclusion of unlawful discrimination. In reviewing Judge La
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Jeunesse's decision, the Appeals Board may substitute its judgment for that of Judge La Jeunesse,
United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807,811 (Utah 1980), and may affirm,
modify or reverse his decision, or remand for further proceedings. See §34A-1-303(4) Utah Code
Annotated.

FINDINGS OF FACT
Having carefully considered the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the
hearing in this matter, the Appeals Board enters the following findings of fact and sets aside Judge
La Jeunesse's findings to the extent they are inconsistent with these findings.
Mr. Tarkeshian is of Iranian national origin. He holds Bachelor of Science degrees in both
mathematics and engineering. He has been employed as an engineer by the Salt Lake County Public
Works Department since 1977. The Public Works Department is comprised of several divisions,
including the Engineering Division, where Mr. Tarkeshian works on flood control projects, and the
Development Services Division, which includes engineers who review subdivision surveys and
designs.
Mr. Tarkeshian began his career with the County at a "grade 24," what was then the entry
level for engineers. In 1980, the County established standards by which engineers could advance to
higher grades within the County's personnel classification system. Under this "career ladder," the
entry level for engineers remained at grade 24. However, engineers who obtained one of several
specified professional engineering certifications were entitled to automatic advancement to grade 26.
Additional qualifications were established for further advancement to grade 28.l
The County assisted its entry level engineers in obtaining certification by authorizing use of
work time for study, providing study materials and also establishing study groups. For personal
reasons, Mr. Tarkeshian did not avail himself of these opportunities and has never obtained
certification.
Some years after instituting its career ladder for engineers, the County recognized that
engineers working in its Development Services Division had substantial responsibilities related to
land surveys. For that reason, the County permitted engineers in that division to substitute a
surveyor's license for the engineering certification that was otherwise required under the career
ladder standard. In other words, engineers in the Development Services Division were advanced
from grade 24 to grade 26 without engineering certification if, instead, they obtained a surveyor's
license. In implementing this policy, the County did not adequately update its written career path
l A few years ago, the entire career ladder was upgraded, with the grades increasing from 24/26/28
to 26/28/30.
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policy. However, the new policy was incorporated in recruitment bulletins during 1998 and
thereafter and was consistently applied within the Development Services Division. For engineers
working in other divisions the engineering certification requirement continued to be applied.
The foregoing requirements applied only to those County employees classified as engineers
and not to other classifications. The County Personnel Director, rather than the County's individual
departments or division, establishes minimum job qualifications.
Mr. Tarkeshian has identified a number of individuals he believes were promoted to higher
grade levels despite their lack of engineering certification. The circumstances of each of these
individuals are discussed below.
• Brent Tidwell. At the time the County instituted its engineering career ladder, Mr.
Tidwell was already employed as engineering section manager within the Development
Services Division at a grade 27. He did not have engineering certifications, but his position
was primarily supervisory and administrative. The County allowed him to remain where he
was. At some point, he obtained a surveyor's license and his grade was increased.
• Reid Penman. Mr. Denman began work for the County in 1976 and, over 25 years,
worked his way through various survey and engineering technician jobs until he was selected
for an opening as an entry level, grade 24 engineer in the Development Services Division.
After six years in that position, he was selected to manage the Division, thereby replacing Mr.
Tidwell. Mr. Denman had a surveyor's license.
• Martin Knaphus. Mr. Knaphus was employed as an engineer, grade 28, in the
Development Services Division. He has a surveyor's license.
• Denton Mecham. Mr. Mecham is currently Director of the Sanitation Division, at a grade
33. In that capacity, he performs no engineering functions and no certification is required.
Prior to his current position, he was Pavement Management Supervisor at a grade 26 in the
Public Works Operations Division. That position did not require any certification.
• Ricky Olsen. Mr. Olsen is Flood Control Supervisor, Grade 28. His position does not
require professional certification.
• Larry Taggart. Mr. Taggart retired from County service in December 1998, as an
engineer 24 in the same Division as Mr. Tarkeshian. He does not have a professional
engineer certification. He was rehired as a temporary part-time employee during August,
1999 at grade 26. As a temporary employee his hourly wage is 25% less than the wage he
received before retirement. He receives no fringe benefits and has no merit protection.
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County policy exempts temporary individuals from meeting minimum job qualifications that
would be applicable to full time merit employees.
• Stephen Dale. Mr. Dale was hired in 1998 as an engineer, grade 26, in the Development
Services Division. He has a surveyor's license.
Mr. Tarkeshian receives a performance evaluation from his supervisor each year. At the end
of 1998, he was rated as meeting or exceeding expectations in all categories of his evaluation. During
November 1999, Mr. Tarkeshian filed his discrimination complaint against the County. A few
months later, he received his performance evaluation for 1999. The evaluation was somewhat lower
than the year before. Mr. Tarkeshian received an unsatisfactory evaluation in one of the seven
categories, but was rated as meeting expectations in 5 other categories. He received an "exceeding
expectations" rating in one category. Overall, he was rated as successful for 1999.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-5-106 of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act prohibits employers from
discriminating in the terms or conditions of employment because of, among other factors, national
origin. Section 106 also prohibits retaliation against employees who have filed discrimination
complaints. These provisions of the Act are equivalent to federal statutes prohibiting employment
discrimination. Therefore, in interpreting and applying the Utah Act, the Commission and Utah's
appellate courts have generally followed the precedent established by the federal courts in
interpreting and applying federal antidiscrimination law. Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38
P.3d 993, 995 (Utah App.); Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d 1103 (Utah App.
1995); University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987). The Appeals Board
will likewise consider federal precedent in evaluating Mr. Tarkeshian's claims of discrimination
based on his national origin and retaliation.
Mr. Tarkeshian's claim of discrimination based on national origin. Mr. Tarkeshian contends
that, because of his Iranian national origin, the County applied more stringent "career ladder"
requirements to him than it applied to other County engineers. Mr. Tarkeshian further contends that
this discrimination prevented him from receiving the increases in grade and pay that other similarly
situated employees received.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.792 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
defined the burden of production and order for presentation of proof for claims of intentional
discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. In such cases, the individual alleging
discrimination must first establish a "prima facie" case. The employer is then required to come
forward with a non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. If the employer produces such an
explanation, it falls to the trier of fact to decide the ultimate question: Did the employer intentionally
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discriminate against the employee for an unlawful reason. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502; also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, (2000); also Victron/Lika, 38
P.3dat995.
Here, Mr. Tarkeshian has discharged his initial obligation of establishing aprimafacie claim
of employment discrimination, based on national origin. Likewise, the County has fulfilled its
obligation of providing a non-discriminatory explanation of its treatment of Mr.Tarkeshian. With the
case in this posture and considering all relevant evidence and permissible inferences, the Appeals
Board must address the ultimate question: Did the County in fact, discriminate against Mr.
Tarkeshian because of his national origin? In considering this ultimate question, the Appeals Board
finds the following facts to be persuasive.
Mr. Tarkeshian has been employed by the County for more than 25 years. He has identified
no instances during that time of any conflict or comment from co-worker, supervisor or manager
related to his national origin. Furthermore, Mr. Tarkeshian has presented no evidence regarding the
national origin of his co-workers and supervisors. The Appeals Board finds that Mr. Tarkeshian's
national origin was not a factor in his work environment.
Mr. Tarkeshian acknowledges that, for many years, the County has had a "career ladder" for
engineers that allowed for professional development and concomitant advancement in grade and pay.
Mr. Tarkeshian also acknowledges that he has not obtained any of the professional certifications that
would allow him to automatically move up the career ladder from an entry level grade 24 to a grade
26. Consequently, the County's career ladder system appears to be a legitimate, non-discriminatory
explanation for Mr. Tarkeshian's failure to advance.
However, Mr. Tarkeshian argues the County's career ladder should not be taken at face value
because it has been inconsistently applied to favor other individuals who are similarly situated to Mr.
Tarkeshian, but are not of Iranian national origin. It is Mr. Tarkeshian's theory that because of his
national origin, he has remained at the bottom rung of the career ladder.
The Appeals Board has carefully considered the evidence presented by Mr. Tarkeshian and
the County regarding the advancement of other engineers in County service and the failure to
advance Mr. Tarkeshian. The Appeals Board concludes that the so-called disparities in treatment are
attributable to the other engineers meeting the County's requirements for advancement and other
legitimate reasons that are not related to Mr. Tarkeshian's national origin.
Most of the individuals identified by Mr. Tarkeshian as having received favorable treatment
were in the Development Division. As such, their duties focused on evaluation and approval of
subdivision surveys. It was reasonable for the County to allow engineers in that division to
substitute a surveyor's license for the engineering certification that was otherwise required by the
career ladder system.
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Mr. Tarkeshian has also identified individuals who have been promoted to manage various
divisions who lack engineering certification. However, it is undisputed that the County's personnel
classification system does not require engineering certifications for the individuals in those positions.
Furthermore, Mr. Tarkeshian has not applied for these or any other management positions with the
County.
Finally, Mr. Tarkeshian points to Mr. Taggart, who also lacks any engineering certification
and who retired from County service as an engineer 24 in the same division as Mr. Tarkeshian. Mr.
Taggart was later rehired as a temporary part-time employee at a grade 26. However, as a temporary
employee, Mr. Taggart is paid 25% less than the wage he received before retirement, with no fringe
benefits or merit protection. Thus, the grade designation for temporary part-time employees is not
directly comparable to the grade designation for regular employees. Under these circumstances, the
Appeals Board is unable to conclude that Mr. Taggart has been treated more favorably than Mr.
Tarkeshian.
In light of the foregoing facts surrounding the relative treatment of Mr. Tarkeshian and his
co-workers at the County, the Appeals Board concludes that any differences are attributable to
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons and are not related to Mr. Tarkeshian's national origin. While
the County could have done a better job of conforming its written policies to its actual practices that
inadequacy, when viewed in the context of all the evidence, does not persuade the Appeals Board
that the County was engaged in unlawful employment discrimination against Mr. Tarkeshian.
Mr. Tarkeshian7 s allegation of retaliation. Although Mr. Tarkeshian contends the County
retaliated against him for filing a discrimination complaint with UALD, the only alleged retaliation
was a reduction in the subjective evaluation of his work performance from the 1998 to the 1999
evaluation. But in both years Mr. Tarkeshian received at least a "successful" evaluation. He has
presented no evidence that his marginally lower evaluation in 1999 had any consequence with
respect to the terms or conditions of his employment or any likely effect on future job opportunities.
Without such evidence that he suffered an "adverse action," Mr. Tarkeshian's retaliation claim must
fail. Tran v. Trustees of the State Colleges. 355 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2004), citing Burlington
Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth. 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Hillig v. Rumsfeld. 2004 W.L 190946 (10th
Circuit August 27, 2004). The Appeals Board therefore finds it unnecessary to consider the other
elements of that claim.
Conclusion. In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that the County did not
discriminate against Mr. Tarkeshian because of his national origin, nor did the County retaliate
against Mr. Tarkeshian for having filed a discrimination complaint against the County.
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ORDER
The Appeals Board grants Salt Lake County's motion for review, sets aside Judge La
Jeunesse's decision in this matter, and dismisses Mr. Tarkeshian's claims of employment
discrimination against the County. It is so ordered.
Dated this J?/ day of October, 2004.

"C~olleen"S. Coltbn, Chair

Patricia S. Drawe

Thomas Carlson'

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.

2 Appeals Board member Joseph Hatch having recused himself from participating as a member
of the Appeals Board in this matter, the remaining members of the Appeals Board have
temporarily designated Thomas Carlson to serve in place of Mr. Hatch, pursuant to §34A-1303(5)(c) of the Utah Labor Commission Act.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review in the matter of
Mostafa (Jim) Tarkeshian, Case No. 8-00-0083, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ d a y
of October, 200$ to the following:
MOSTAFA (JIM) TARKESHIAN
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84190
and by Interdepartmental Mail to:
SHERRIE HAYASHI, DIRECTOR
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND LABOR DIVISION

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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H i s t o r y : L. 1965, ch. 29, *} 3; 1990, eh. 283,
fc 6.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Countv
Chapter 24 of tins title

treasure]
r,

17-32-4. Oaths and bonds to be filed.
The oath and bond of the office of a bail commissioner shall be filed with the
county clerks* of their respective counties.
H i s t o r y : L. 1965, ch. 29, <? 4; 1990, ch. 283,
fc 7.

C r o s s - R c t e r e n c e s . — County clerk, Chapter 20 of tins title

CHAPTER 33
COUNTY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
ACT
Section
17-33-1

17-33-2
17-33-3
17-33-4

17-33-4 5

37-33-5

17-33-6
17-33-7

Section
Title — Establishment of merit
svstcm — Separate systems
for peace officers and firemen
recognized — Options of
small counties
Definitions
Merit principles
Career service council — Members and alternate member?
— Powers and duties — Appeals — Time limit — Qualifications,
appointment,
terms, and compensation of
council members
Council ma\ refer an appeal to
an administrative lav* judge
for a recommendation —
Council action on recommendation
Of rice of personnel management
— Director — Appointment
and responsibilities — Personnel rules
Certification of eligibility bv director — Power of director to
examine payrolls
Functions of countv office of per-

17-33-8
17-33-9

17-33-10

17-33-11
17-330 2

17-33-13
17-3304
17-33-15

sonnel management — Personnel functions of county
agencies, departments, or officea
Career service — Exempt positions
Acceptance of exempt position
by career service employee —
Reappointment register
Grievance and appeals procedure — Employees' complaints of discriminatory or
unfair employment practice.
Political activities of employees
Reciprocal agreements for benefit of system — Cooperation
by director with other governmental agencies
Prohibited actions
Violations — Misdemeanor —
Ineligibility for employment
and forfeiture of position
Duty of county legislative body
to provide rules or regulations
— Conflicts with state or federal law

17-33-1. Title — Establishment of merit system — Separate systems for peace officers and firemen recognized — Options of small counties.
(V This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "County Personnel
Management Act "
(2) A merit system of personnel administration for the counties of the state
of Utah, their departments, offices, and agencies, except as otherwise specifically provided, is established
(3) This chapter recognizes the existence of the merit systems for peace
officers of the several counties as provided for m Chapter 30, Deputy Sheriffs
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— Merit System, and for firemen of the several counties as provided for m
Chapter 28, Firemen's Civil Service Commission, and is intended to give
county commissions the option of using the provisions of this chaptei as a
single meiit system for all county employees oi m combination with these
existing systems for firemen and peace officers
(4) This chapter is optional with counties having fewer than 130 full-time,
part-time, and seasonal employees and elected officials not covered by other
merit systems
H i s t o r y . C. 1953, 17-33-1, e n a c t e d by L
1981, e h . 81, *} 2; 2001, ch. 241, *> 46.
Repeals* a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1983, ch 81 § 1 repeals forrrer H 17 33 1 to
17 33 20 as enacted by Laws 1969 ch 45 ^ 3
to 20, and as amended by Laws 1977, ch 61,
§ 1, 1978, ch 5, § 1 and 1979, ch 61, § 1
relating to the county merit system Laws 1981,
ch 81, § 2 enacts present §§ 17-33-1 to 17 33
14 Laws 1981, ch 81 § 3 enacts piesent
§ 17-33-15

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . - - fht 2001 aire id
ment effective April 30 2001, ,n Subsection <J;
updated code citations, m Substcion (4j sub
sbtuted 'full-time part time and ^.oasonai em
ployees and elected officials for ' e m p l o ) C ( ^
and made stylistic chang* s
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — State personnel man
affement Title 67, Chaptei 19

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am J u r . 2d. — 15A Am J u r 2d Civil Service
§ 1 et seq
A.L.R. — Validity, under Federal Constitu
tion of regulations rules, or statutes requiring

17-33-2,

random or mass d^ug testing of public employ
ees oi persons whose employment is ipgulattd
by state, local, oi federal go\ erament 86 A L R
Fed 420

Definitions.

As used m this chapter
(1) "Career service position' means any position m the county service
except those exempted under Section 17-33-8
(2) "Council" means the career service couneiJ, a three-member appeals
and personnel advisory board
(3) "Director" means the director of personnel management
(4) "Eligible applicant' means any applicant that meets the job related
minimum requirements established for a position m the career service
(5) "Eligible list" means a list of eligible applicants r a n t e d in order of
relative knowledge, skill, ability and merit
(6) "Exempt positions" means those positions which aie not m the
career service as specified m Section 17-33-8
(7) "Merit system" means a system of personnel administration based
on the principles set forth m Section 17-33-3
(8) "Position classification" means a grouping of positions under the
same title which aie sufficiently similar to be compensated at the s a n e
salary range and to which the same tests of ability can be applied
(9) "Provisional appointment" means an aprointment to fill a position
pending the establishment of a register for such po^inon
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 17-33-2, e n a c t e d by L.
1981, ch. 8 1 , * 2; 1993, ch. 227, * 160, 1994,
ch, 12, «> 13; 3994, ch 146, <> 15, 1999, ch
182, * 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1999 amend

ment, effectne Ma} 3, 1999 deJe^d foimer
Subsection (2) which defined 'certincauoa,' re
designating the b l o w i n g subsections a<u;H
mgly
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17-33-3. Merit principles.
It is the policy of this state that each county may establish a personnel
system administered in a manner that will provide for the effective implementation of the following merit principles:
(1) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis of their
relative ability, knowledge, and skills, including open consideration of
qualified applicants for initial appointment;
(2) provision of equitable and adequate compensation;
(3) training of employees as needed to assure high-quality performance;
(4) retention of employees on the basis of the adequacy of their
performance, and separation of employees whose inadequate performance
cannot be corrected;
(5) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of personnel administration without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, political affiliation, age, or disability, and with proper regard for
their privacy and constitutional rights as citizens;
(6) provision of information to employees regarding their political
rights and prohibited practices under the Hatch Act; and
(7) provision of a formal procedure for processing the appeals and
grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion, restraint, or
reprisal.
History: C. 1953, 17-33-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 81, § 2; 2001, ch. 73, § 11.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2001 amendmerit, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection (5)
substituted "disability" for "handicap" and

made a stylistic change.
Federal Law. — The federal Hatch Act,
cited in Subsection (6), is 5 U.S C. § 1501 et
seq.

17-33-4. Career service council — Members and alternate
members — Powers and duties — Appeals —
Time limit — Qualifications, appointment, terms,
a n d compensation of council members.
(1) (a) (i) There shall be in each county establishing a system a threemember bipartisan career service council appointed by the county
executive. The members of the council shall be persons in sympathy
with the application of merit principles to public employment.
(ii) (A) The county executive may appoint alternate members of
the career service council to hear-appeals that one or more
regular career service council members are unable to hear.
(B) The term of an alternate member of the career service
council may not exceed one year.
(b) The council shall hear appeals not resolved at lower levels in the
cases of career service employees suspended, transferred, demoted, or
dismissed as well in the cases of other grievances not resolved by the
grievance procedure at the division or departmental level.
(c) The career service council:
(i) may make an initial determination in each appeal whether the
appeal is one of the types of matters under Subsection (l)(bj over
which the council has jurisdiction;
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(ii> shall review written appeals in cases of applicants rejected for
examination and report final binding appeals decisions, in writing, to
the county legislative body,
(iii) may not hear any other personnel matter; and
(iv) may affirm, modify, vacate, or set aside an order for disciplinary
action
(d) (i) A person adversely affected by a decision of the career service
council may appeal the decision to the district court.
(ii) An appeal to the district court under this Subsection Q)(d) is
barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the career service council
issues its decision.
(iiij If there is a record of the career service council proceedings, the
district court review shall be limited to the record provided by the
career service council.
(iv) In reviewing a decision of the career service council, the district
court shall presume that the decision is valid and may determine only
whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious.
(2) Each council member shall serve a term of three years to expire on J u n e
30, three years after the date of his or her appointment, except that original
appointees shall be chosen as follows: one member for a term expiring June 30,
1982; one member for a term expiring June 30, 1983; and one member for a
term expiring June 30, 1984. Successors of original council members shall be
chosen for three-year terms. An appointment to fill a vacancy on the council
shall be for only the unexpired term of the appointee's successor. Each member
of the board shah hold office until his successor is appointed and confirmed. A
member of the council may be removed by the county executive for cause, after
having been given a copy of the charges against him or her and an opportunity
to be heard publicly on the charges before the county legislative body. Adequate
annual appropriations shall be made available to enable the council effectively
to carry out its duties under this law.
(3) Members and alternates of the council shall be United States citizens
and be actual and bona fide residents of the state of Utah and the county from
which appointed for a period of not less than one year preceding the date of
appointment and a member may not hold another government office or be
employed by the county.
(4) The council shall elect one of its members as chairperson, and two or
more members of the council shall constitute a quorum necessary for carrying
on the business and activity of the council.
& The council shall have subpoena power to compel attendance of witnesses, and to authorize witness fees where it deems appropriate, to be paid at
the same rate as in justice courts.
(6) (a) li) Council members shall receive compensation for each day or
partial day they are in session at a per diem rate determined by the
county legislative body.
di x An alternate member shall receive compensation for each day
or partial day that the alternate member is required to replace a
regular council member, ai a per diem rate determined by the county
legislative body
(b) The county legislative body may periodically adjust the compensation rate for inflation.
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The 2001 amendment, effective April 30,
2001, m Subsection (l)iaKi) substituted 'executive" for "legislative body," added Subsections
(l)(a)(ii) and (IXcXiv), substituted the piesent
Subsection (l)(d) for former provisions which
stated that the light of appeal shall not be
abridged and referred to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in Subsection (2j substituted
"county executive" for 'governing body," in Subsection (3) added "and alternates" near the
beginning, added Subsection i6)(a)(ii), and
made related changes
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Fees of jurors and
witnesses, § 78-46-24 et seq

H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 17-33-4, e n a c t e d by L.
1981, c h . 8 1 , § 2; 1994, ch. U6, *t J 6; 1999,
ch. 182, <> 2; 2001. eh. 241, $ 47.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1999 amendment, effective Ma/ 3 1999, subdivided Subsection Q) inserted "career service" in Subsection
(] Kb) added the introductory phrase m Subsection OKc), added Subsections (l)(c)(i) and
(Dk'/in), added "Notwithstanding the other
provisions of this Subsection ( i T m Subsection
(l)(d) subt-ntuted va pei d»era rate determined
bv the county legislative body" tor 'the rate oi
$50 per dieni" in Subsection (C), and made
related and stylistic changes throughout the
section

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Immunity.
In a civil rights action brought by a prison
psychiatrist who had been reassigned and subsequently discharged for cuticizmg a local jail's
conditions, individual members of the career

service were protected by quasi-judicial lmmunity because their functions and duties were
comparable to state judges' Atiya v Salt Lake
County, 988 F.2d 1013 (10th Cir. 1993)

17-33-4.5. Council may refer an appeal to an administrative law judge for a recommendation — Council
action on recommendation.
(1) (a) A conniy legislative body may appoint one or more administrative
law judges to hear appeals referred by a career service council under this
section.
(b) Each administrative lav/ judge shall be trained and experienced in
personnel matters
(2) (a) If a career service council determines that it is in the county's best
interest, it may initially refer an appeal to an administrative law judge
who has been appointed under Subsection (1).
(b) After holding a hearing, the administrative law judge shall make
findings of fact and a recommendation to the career service council.
(c) After receiving the administrative law judge's recommendation, a
career service council may request the administrative law judge to hold a
further factual hearing before the career service council's decision.
(d) A career service council may adopt or reject an administrative law
judge's recommendation, whether before or after a further hearing under
Subsection (2)(c)
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 17-33-4.5, e n a c t e d bv L,
2001, ch. 241, <j 48.
Effective D a t e s , — Laws 2001 ch 241

became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

17-35-5, Office of personnel management — Director —
Appointment and responsibilities — Personnel
rules.
(V (a) Each county executive shall:
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(i) create an office of personnel management, administered by a
director of personnel management; and
(ii) ensure that the director is a person with proven experience in
personnel management.
(b) The position of director oi personnel management shall be:
(i) a merit position; and
(11) filled as provided m Subsection (lKcj.
(c) The career service council shall'
(i) advertise and recruit for the director position in the same
manner as for merit positions,
(ii) select three names from a register, and
(hi) submit those names as recommendations to the county legislative body,
(dj The county legislative body shall select a person to serve as director
of the office of personnel management from the names submitted to it by
the career service council.
(2) The director of personnel management shall:
(a) encourage and exercise leadership in the development of expertise
in personnel administiation within the several departments, offices, and
agencies in the county service and make available the facilities of the office
of personnel management to this end.
(b) advise the county legislative and executive bodies on the use of
human resources;
(c) develop and implement programs for the improvement of employee
effectiveness, such as training, safety, health, counseling, and welfare;
(d) investigate periodically the operation and effect of this law and of
the policies made under it and report findings and recommendations to the
county legislative body;
(e) establish and maintain records of all employees in the county
service, setting forth as to each employee class, title, pay or status, and
other relevant data;
(f) make an annual report to the county legislative body and county
executive regarding the work of the department; and
(g) apply and carry out this law and the policies under it and perform
any other lawful acts that arc necessary to carry out the provisions of this
law.
(3) (a) (i) The director shall recommend personnel rules for the county.
(ii) The county legislative body may approve, amend, or reject those
rules before they are adopted,
(b) The rules shall provide for.
(i) recruiting efforts to be planned and carried out in a manner that
assures open competition, with special emphasis to be placed on
recruiting efforts to attract minorities, women, persons with a disability as denned by and covered under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12102, or other groups that are substantially
underrepresented in the county work force to help assure they will be
among the candidates from whom appointments are made;
(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements wherever practical, that all successful candidates shail be required to meet
in order to be eligible for consideration for appointment or promotion,
(hi) selection procedures that include consideration of the relative
merit of each applicant for employment, a job related method of
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determining the eligibility or ineligibility of each applicant, and a
valid, reliable, and objective system of ranking eligible applicants
according to their qualifications and merit;
(iv) certification procedures that insure equitable consideration of
an appropriate number of the most qualified eligible applicants based
on the ranking system;
(v) appointments to positions in the career service by selection from
the most qualified eligible applicants certified on eligible lists established in accordance with Subsections (3)(b)(iiij and (iv);
(vi) noncompetitive appointments in the occasional instance where
there is evidence that open or limited competition is not practical,
such as for unskilled positions that have no minimum job requirements;
(vii) limitation of competitions at the discretion of the director for
appropriate positions to facilitate employment of qualified applicants
with a substantial physical or mental impairment, or other groups
protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act;
(viii) permanent appointment for entry to the career service that
shall be contingent upon satisfactory performance by the employee
during a period of six months, with the probationary period extendable for a period not to exceed six months for good cause, but with the
condition that the probationary employee may appeal directly to the
council any undue prolongation of the period designed to thwart merit
principles;
(ix) temporary, provisional, or other noncareer service appointments, which may not be used as a way of defeating the purpose of the
career service and may not exceed 90 days, with the period extendable
for a period not to exceed an additional 90 days for good cause;
(x) lists of eligible applicants normally to be used, if available, for
filling temporary positions, and short term emergency appointments
to be made without regard to the other provisions of law to provide for
maintenance of essential services in an emergency situation where
normal procedures are not practical, these emergency appointments
not to exceed 90 days, with that period extendable for a period not to
exceed an additional 90 days for good cause;
(xi) promotion and career ladder advancement of employees to
higher level positions and assurance that all persons promoted are
qualified for the position;
(xii) recognition of the equivalency of other merit processes by
waiving, at the discretion of the director, the open competitive
examination for placement in the career service positions of those who
were originally selected through a competitive examination process in
another governmental entity, the individual in those cases, to serve a
probationary period;
(xiii) preparation, maintenance, and revision of a position classification plan for all positions in the career service, based upon similarity of duties performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same
qualifications may reasonably be required for, and the same schedule
of pay may be equitably applied to, all positions in the same class, the
compensation plan, in order to maintain a high quality public work
force, to take into account the responsibility and difficulty of the work,
752

COUNTY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT

17-33-5

the comparative pay and benefits needed to compete m the labor
market and to stay in proper alignment with other similar governmental units, and other factors;
(xiv) keeping records of performance on all employees in the career
service and requiring consideration of performance records in determining salary increases, any benefits for meritorious service, promotions, the order of layoffs and reinstatements, demotions, discharges,
and transfers;
(xv) establishment of a plan governing layoffs resulting from lack of
funds or work, abolition oppositions, or material changes in duties or
organization, and governing reemployment of persons so laid off,
taking into account with regard to layoffs and reemployment the
relative ability, seniority, and merit of each employee;
(xvi) establishment of a plan for resolving employee grievances and
complaints with final and binding decisions;
(xvii) establishment of disciplinary measures such as suspension,
demotion in rank or grade, or discharge, measures to provide for
presentation of charges, hearing rights, and appeals for all permanent
employees in the career service to the career service council;
(xviii) establishment of a procedure for employee development and
improvement of poor performance;
(xix) establishment of hours of work, holidays, and attendance
requirements in various classes of positions in the career service;
(xx) establishment and publicizing of fringe benefits such as insurance, retirement, and leave programs, and
(xxi) any other requirements not inconsistent with this law that
are proper for its enforcement.
History: C. 1953, 17-33-5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 81, ^ 2; 1989, ch. 132, * 1; 1992, ch.
275, * 1; 1993, ch. 227, 4} 161; 1994, ch. 146,
* 17; 1999, ch. 182, * 3; 2001, ch. 73, <? 12;
2001, ch. 241, * 49.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, inserted "for employment" in Subsection (3)(b)(m), substituted
"and career ladder advancement" for "m such a
manner that eligible permanent career service
employees are considered" m Subsection
(3)(b)(xi), deleted "m the state" after "governmental units" in Subsection (3)(b)(xm), and
made stylistic changes in the section
The 2001 amendment by ch 73, effective
April 30, 2001, m Subsection (3)(b)(i) substituted "persons with a disability as denned by
and covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U S C 12102" for "handicapped' and made stylistic changes

The 2001 amendment by ch 241, effective
April 30, 2001, m Subsection (IXa) substituted
"executive" for "legislative body," substituted
the present Subsection (1Kb) for the former
which described the length of term and appointment of another personnel manager, in
Subsection (2)(f) added "and county executive,"
in Subsection (3)(a) substituted "recommend"
for "issue" and "adopted" for "implemented,"
and made stylistic changes
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel
Meaning of "this law." — The term "this
law," as used m this section, apparently means
Laws 1981, ch 81, codified as ^ 17-33-1 to
17-33-15
Federal Law. — Title VII of the federal Civil
Rights Act, cited in Subsection (3)(b)(vn) is 42
U S C 5; 2000e et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Layoff plan.
A county was not authorized to adopt standards for laying off employees different from
those required undei Subsection (3)(b)(xv),
thus, an employer was required to consider all

three statutory criteria in making reduction in
force determinations Thurston v Box EJder
County, 835 P2d 165 (Utah 1992)
A county may not consider factors in addition
to relative ability, seniority, and merit, allowing
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consideration of factors beyond those stated in
Subsection (3)(b)(xv) would result in no layoff
plan at all, leaving employees subject to arbitrary treatment by their superiors Thurston v
Box Elder County 835 P2d 165 (Utah 1992)
County's use of language from the County
Personnel Management Act m writing the employee reduction in force provision of its policies
and procedures manual manifested an intent to
be subject to a court's interpretation of the Act

when interpreting an ambiguous provision of
the m a n u a l thus, even though the prior decision finding that a county wrongfully terminated an employee overstated the applicability
of the Act to the county's personnel policies and
procedure, the earlier holding would remain
the law of the case for the purposes of resolving
the ambiguity of the manual's provision
Thurston v Box Elder County, 892 P2d 1034
(Utah 1995)

17-33-6. Certification of eligibility by director — Power of
director to examine payrolls.
No new employee shall be hired in a position covered by this chapter, and no
employee shall be changed in pay, title, or status, nor shall any employee be
paid, unless certified by the director as eligible under the provisions of, or
regulations promulgated under, this chapter. The director of personnel management may examine payrolls at any time to determine conformity with this
chapter and the county rules.
History: C. 1953, 17-33-6, e n a c t e d by L.
1981, ch. 81, <} 2.

17-33-7. Functions of county office of personnel management — Personnel functions of county agencies,
departments, or offices.
(1) (a) The county office of personnel management shall perform the functions required by this Subsection (1).
(b) The county executive, county legislative body, and county office of
personnel management may not delegate those functions to a separate
county agency, office, or department.
(c) The county office of personnel management shall:
(i) design and administer a county pay plan that includes salaries,
wages, incentives, bonuses, leave, insurance, retirement, and other
benefits;
(ii) design and administer the county classification plan and grade
allocation system, including final decisions on position classification
and grade allocation;
(iii) conduct position classification studies, including periodic desk
audits, except that an agency, department, or office may submit
classification recommendations to the county office of personnel
management;
(iv) maintain registers of publicly recruited applicants and certification of top-ranking eligible applicants;
(v) monitor county agency, department, or office personnel practices to determine compliance with equal opportunity and affirmative
action guidelines, and
(vi) maintain central personnel records.
(d) The county legislative body may approve, amend, or reject the pay
plan.
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(2) County agencies, departments, or offices shall
(a) establish initial job descriptions,
(h) recommend position classifications and grade allocations,
(c) make final selections for appointments and promotions to vacant
positions,
(d) conduct performance evaluations,
(e) discipline employees, and
(f) perform other functions appioved by the county executive, and
agreed to by the county agency, office, or department
History: C. 1953, 17-33-7, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 81, <* 2 ; 1 9 9 1 , c h . 134, <j 3;J992*,eh.
275, ^ 2; 1999, ch. 182, *> 4; 2001, ch. 241,
^ 50.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend
ment, effective May 3 1999, m Subsection
(D(cXiv) inserted "of publicly recruited apph-

cants" and "top-ranking " deleted "from lists of
certified ehgibles" m Subsection (2)(c), and
made one minor stylistic change
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30,
2001 substituted "county executive" for "legis
lative body' m Subsection (2XO

17-33-8. Career service — Exempt positions.
The career service shall be a permanent service to which this law shall apply
and shall comprise all tenured positions m the public service now existing or
hereafter established, except the following
(1) The county executive members of the county legislative body, other
elected officials, and major department heads charged directly by the
county legislative body, or by a board appointed by the county legislative
body, with the responsibility of assisting m the formulation and carrying
out of matters of policy, and if it is sought that any position which differs
from its present status be exempted or tenured after the effective date of
this act, a public hearing on the proposed exemption or tenure shall be
held upon due notice and the concurrence of the council
(2) One confidential secretary for each elected county officer and major
department head if one is assigned
(3) An administrative assistant to the county executive, each member of
the count}' legislative body, and to each elected official, if one is assigned
(4) The duly appointed chief deputy of any elected county officer who
would take over and discharge the duties of the elected county officer in
the absence or disability of the originally responsible officer
(5) Persons employed to make or conduct a tempoiary and special
inquiry, investigation, or examination on behalf of the county legislative
body or one of its committees
(6) Noncareer employees compensated for their services on a seasonal
or contractual basis who are hired on emergency or seasonal appointment
basis, as approved by the council, and provisional or part-time employees
as defined by the county's policies and piocedares or its rules and
regulations
(7) Positions which by their nature — confidential or key policydetermining or both — cannot or should not be appropriately included m
the career service All positions designated as being exempt under this
subsection shall be listed in the rules and regulations promulgated under
this act by job title and department, office or agency, and any change in
exempt status shall constitute an amendment to the rules and regulations
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History: C. 1953, 17-33-8, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 81, ^ 2; 1994, ch. 146, fc 18; 2001,
ch. 241, i} 51.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added "county
executive'1 in Subsections (1) and (3) and made
stylistic changes

Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this
act," and presumably also "this law," as used m
this section, mean Laws 1981, ch 8 1 , which
enacted this chapter The term "effective date of
this act," in Subsection (1), means the effective
date of Laws 1981, ch 81, I e , July 1, 1981

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Granting of exempt status
Relation to county policy
Granting of exempt status.
Only the merit council can confer exempt
status and then only to major department
heads charged directly by the governing body
with assisting in policy formulation and implementation, county commissioners have no authority to gi-ant exemptions from merit status
by passing ordinances Layton v Swapp, 484 F
Supp 958 (D Utah 1979) (decided under prior
law)

Relation to county policy.
Where, under a county's personnel manual,
the plaintiff was a permanent employee who
could not have been discharged except for
cause, curtailment of work, or lack of funds,
this section did not supersede the county
manual to make her position "exempt" rather
than permanent, the county opted to have its
own merit system, as delineated m its manual,
and its restrictive discharge policy gave the
plaintiff a property interest m continued employment that could not be curtailed without
constitutional protections West v Grand
County, 967 F2d 362 (10th Cir 1992)

17-33-9. Acceptance of exempt position by career service
employee — Reappointment register.
(1) Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt
position who is not retained by the appointing officer, unless discharged for
cause as provided by this act or by regulation, shall:
(a) be appointed to any career service position for which the employee
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to the employee's last position in the
career service provided an opening exists; or
(b) be appointed to any lesser career service position for which the
employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsection (1) of this section.
(2) The director shall maintain a reappointment register to facilitate the
operation of this section, which shall have precedence over other registers.
History: C. 1953, 17-33-9, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 81, *} 2.
Meaning of "this act." — Sep note under

catchhnc "Meaning of 'this law"' following
§ 17-33-5

17-33-10. Grievance and appeals procedure — Employees*
complaints of discriminatory or unfair employment practice,
(1) Any county to which the provisions of this act apply shall establish in its
personnel rules and regulations a grievance and appeals procedure. The
procedure shall be used to resolve disputes arising from grievances as defined
in the rules and regulations, including but not limited to acts of discrimination
The procedure may also be used by employees in the event of dismissal,
demotion, suspension, or transfer.
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(2) Any charge by a'county career service employee of discriminatory or
unfair employment practice as prohibited by Section 34A-5-106, can be filed
with the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor within the Labor Commission. Complaints shall be filed within 30 days of the issuance of a written
decision of the county career service council.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 17-33-10, e n a c t e d by L.
1981, ch. 81, fr 2; 1996, ch. 240, * 3; 1997, eh.
375, £ 4.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "34A5-106" for "35A-5-106" and "Division of Ancidis-

crimination and Labor within the Labor
Commission" for "Division of Labor, Safety, and
Program Regulation" m Subsection (2).
M e a n i n g of "this a c t / ' — See note under
catchhne "Meaning of 'this law'" following
* 17-33-5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Rights of state and municipal public employees m grie\ ance proceedings, 46
A.L R 4th 913

17-33-11. Political activities of employees.
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter for federally aided programs, county emplo}Tees may
voluntarily participate in political activity subject to the following provisions:
(1) No person shall be denied the opportunity to become an applicant for
a position under the merit system in any covered department by virtue of
political opinion or affiliation.
(2) No person employed by the county under the merit system may be
dismissed from service as a result of political opinion or affiliation.
(3) A county career service employee may voluntarily contribute funds
to political groups and become a candidate for public office.
(4) No county officer or emplo}^ee. whether elected or appointed, may
directly or indirectly coerce, command, or advise any officer or employee
covered under the merit system to pay, lend, or contribute part of his or her
salary or compensation or anything else of value to any party, committee,
organization, agency, or person for political purposes. No county officer or
employee, whether elected or appointed, may attempt to make any officer's
or employee's personnel status dependent upon the employee's support or
lack of support for any political party, committee, organization, agency, or
person engaged in a political activity.
(5) No officer or employee may engage in any political activity during
the hours of employment nor shall any person solicit political contributions from county employees during hours of employment for political
purposes, but nothing in this section shall preclude voluntary contribution
by a county employee to the party or candidate of the employee's choice.
(6) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to permit
partisan political activity of any county employee who is prevented or
restricted from engaging m such political activity by the provision of the
federal Hatch Act.
History: C. 1953. 17-33-11, e n a c t e d by L.
1981, ch. 81, fc 2; 1983, ch. 05, $ 1.

F e d e r a l Law. — See note under
catchhne following $ 17-33-3
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U t a h Law Review. — Eligibility of Public
Officers and Employees to Serve m the State
Legislature An Essay on Separation of Powers,
Politics, and Constitutional Policy, 1988 Utah
L Rev. 295(1988)

A.L.R. — Validity construction, and effect of
state statutes restricting political activities of
public officers or employees, 51 A.L.R.4th 702.

17-33-12. Reciprocal agreements for benefit of system —
Cooperation by director with other governmental agencies.
(1) The county may enter into reciprocal agreements, upon such terms as
may be agreed upon, for the use of equipment, materials, facilities, and
services with any public agency or body for purposes deemed of benefit to the
public personnel system.
(2) The director may cooperate with other governmental agencies charged
with public personnel administration in conducting personnel tests, recruiting
personnel, training personnel, establishing lists from which eligibles shall be
certified for appointment and for t h e interchange of personnel and their
benefits.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 17-33-12, e n a c t e d by L.
1981, ch. 81, & 2.

17-33-13- Prohibited actions.
(1) It is an offense for a person to make any false statement, certificate,
mark, rating, or report with regard to any test, certification, or appointment
made under any provision of this law or in any manner commit or attempt to
commit any fraud preventing the impartial execution of this chapter.
(2) It is an offense for a person, under circumstances not amounting to a
violation of Section 76-8-103 or 76-8-105, to directly or indirectly, give, render,
pay, offer, solicit, or accept any money, service, or other valuable consideration
for any appointment, proposed appointment, promotion, or proposed promotion to, or for any advantage in, a position in the career service.
(3) It is an offense for any employee of the personnel department, examiner,
or other person to:
(a) defeat, deceive, or obstruct any person in his or her right to
examination, eligibility, certification, or appointment under this chapter;
or
(b) furnish to any person any special or secret information for the
purpose of affecting the rights or prospects of any person with respect to
employment in the career service.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 17-33-13, e n a c t e d by L.
1981, ch. 81, * 2; 1998, ch. 92, $ 4.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, made stylistic
changes to Subsections (1) to (3) to begin each
subsection with the "It is an offense for'' language, inserted "under circumstances not

amounting to a violation of Section 76-8-103 or
76-8-105, to" m Subsection (2), and subdivided
Subsection (3), adding the (a) and (b) designa
tions
M e a n i n g of " t h i s law." — See note under
game catch line following § 17-33-5
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17-33-14. Violations — Misdemeanor — Ineligibility for
employment and forfeiture of position.
(1) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter or the
rules and regulations promulgated under it is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) Any person who has been adjudged guilty of violating any of the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations promulgated under it
shall, for a period of five years, in addition to the sanctions of Subsection (1),
be ineligible for appointment to or employment in a position in the county
service, and if an officer or employee of the county, shall forfeit that office or
position.
History: C. 1953, 17-33-14, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 81, <* 2; 1991, ch. 241, t> 12.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, ^ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301

17-33-15. Duty of county legislative body to provide rules
or regulations — Conflicts with state or federal
law.
(1) It shall be the duty of the count}' legislative body to provide by rule or
regulation for the operation and functioning of any activity within the purpose
and spirit of the act which is necessary and expedient.
(2) If any provision of this act or the application thereof is found to be in
conflict with any state or federal law, conflict with which would impair funding
otherwise receivable from the state or federal government, the conflicting part
is hereby declared to be inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with
respect to the department, agency, or institution of the county directly affected,
but such finding shall not affect the operation of the remainder of this act in
any of its applications.
(3) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, no rule or regulation
shall be adopted by the county legislative body which would deprive the county
or any of its departments, agencies, or institutions of state or federal grants or
other forms of financial assistance.
History: C. 1953, 17-33-15, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 81, t> 3; 1993, ch. 227, * 162.
Compiler's Notes. — For meaning of "the

act" and "this act," see note under catchlme
"Meaning of'this law"' following § 17-33-5.

CHAPTER 34
MUNICIPAL-TYPE SERVICES TO
UNINCORPORATED AREAS
Section
17-34-1

17

i /-d4-2
17-34-3

Counties may provide municipal
services — Limitation — First
class counties required to provide paramedic and detective
investigative services
lepeaJed
Repealed
Taxes or service charges

Section
17-34-4
17-34-5
17-34-6
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Contracts under Interlocal Cooperation Act
Budgeting, accounting for, and
disbursing of funds — Annual
audit
State to indemnify county regardm g refusal io glte n u c i e a r w a s t e
— Terms and conditions

ADDENDUM D: POLICY 5100

Tarkeshian Bnef ***page 42

5100
SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY & PROCEDURE
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
REFERENCE
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotated 17-3 3-8
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotated 17-33-5,
(3) (h)
Personnel Policy & Procedure:
Pay Practices
Overtime & Compensatory Practices
Revised Ordinance Salt Lake County 1-5-12
Revised Ordinance Salt Lake County January 17, 1980
PURPOSE
To define and provide uniform and consistent employment practices
used in Salt Lake County Government.
SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS POLICY
Exempt Employment
Full-Time Merit
Hiring Status
Part-Time Merit Employment with County Benefits
Part-Time Merit Employment without County Benefits
Probationary
DEFINITIONS
-CLERICAL OPEN RECRUITMENT REGISTER: An open recruitment register
(definition below) which is used to fill specific clerical merit
positions such as Office Specialist or Secretary.
COUNTY BENEFITS: All benefits in addition to FICA, Unemployment
Insurance, Workers Compensation and retirement.
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: The assignment of an employee to one of eleven
employment categories, i.e. regular, merit probation, provisional,
temporary, part-time merit employment with County benefits, parttime merit employment without County benefits, intern, reserve
deputies, appointed, federal man-power, and elected.
EXEMPT EMPLOYEE: Elected members of the governing body, other
elected officials, major department heads appointed by the
governing body or by a board established by the governing body or
Page 1 of 11
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any other employee not covered under the merit system provisions of
the County Personnel Management Act. Exempt employees include
provisionals, temporaries, interns, reserve deputies, appointed
positions, federal program employees, and elected officials.
MERIT EMPLOYEE: An employee who has satisfactorily completed a
merit probation period with Salt Lake County and is therefore
entitled to all merit system benefits appropriate to hours worked.
NEW HIRE MERIT EMPLOYEE: One who has been selected from a merit
register.
PAYROLL UNIT: An organization (Division, Department or Elected
Office) or sub-unit of an organization identified by a four-digit
organizational code.
PROBATIONARY PERIOD: A six (6) month probationary period that must
be satisfactorily completed by a new merit system employee, i.e.
one who has been selected from a merit register or a rehired merit
employee, prior to obtaining regular status.
The probationary
period may be extended for up to an additional six (6) months for
good cause.
FROMOTION: Change in the classification level of a merit employee
to one having a higher entrance/starting grade level.
REHIRE:
The re-employment
without competition.

of a former County merit

employee

REINSTATEMENT: Refers to the mandatory rehire of a former County
merit employee who (a) has been reduced-in-force within the last
six months; or (b) is a veteran eligible under the Vietnam Era
Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974; or (c) has been
reinstated as a result of Career Service Council or subsequent
court action.

PROCEDURE
1.0

Probationary (Status 03)
1.1 Status as a merit employee shall be conditional upon the
satisfactory completion of a merit probationary period.
Merit probationary employees may be terminated at any
time
for
unsatisfactory
performance
including
inappropriate or unprofessional behavior.
1.2 The merit probationary period is the first six months of
employment following the hire date of an employee who has
been certified from a merit employment register.
1.2.1 Merit probation is required of:
1.2.1.1 all new hire merit employees;
1.2.1.2 rehired merit employees;
1.2.1.3 employees transferring from merit exempt
positions to merit covered positions who
Page 2 of 11
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are eligible for rehire due to previous
merit status but who have a break in
County service between the merit and
exempt appointments;
1.2.1.4 employees transferring from other merit
systems who have not completed an
original merit probation with Salt Lake
County unless being transferred with an
entire program or service;
1.2.1.5 employees
reinstated
from
the RIF
retention register who do not return to
the same classification in the same
payroll unit from which they were
terminated.
1.3 The merit probationary period may be extended for up to
an additional six months for good cause.
1.3.1 Any extension to the merit probationary period
shall be communicated in writing to the employee
prior to the completion of the original probation
period, with a copy forwarded to the Personnel
Division.
1.3.2 Individuals who have been placed on extended
merit probation over three months shall be given
performance evaluations at least every three
months. Individuals on extended merit probations
of three months or less, shall be given at least
one performance evaluation near the end of the
extended period.
1.3.2.1 In all cases, evaluations should be given
prior to the end of the extended merit
probationary period.
1.3.3 Employees who have been placed on an approved
extended merit probationary period shall not be
entitled to benefits which are contingent upon
merit employment status except:
1.3.3.1 The right to appeal to the Career Service
Council in cases of discrimination or
concerning undue prolongation of the
probation period .
1.4 Probationary employees shall be evaluated
prior to completion of their six month merit
probationary period.
1.5 Prior to completion of the probationary period, the
hiring authority shall initiate a Personnel Action Form
(CP4), as soon as practical following the performance
evaluation that will either terminate the employee or
extend their merit probationary period.
1.6 A CP4 is not required for employees who successfully
complete the merit probation or approved extended merit
probation period. Such employees shall be considered to
have acquired merit status.
1.7 Promotions - The serving of a merit probationary period
shall not prevent a probationary employee from being
promoted to a position of a higher classification,
Page 3 of 11
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provided the employee is certified from a merit
employment register or is eligible for rehire into the
position. The Administrator may allow the newly hired
employee to serve the original probation period or begin
a new one with the effective the date of the promotion.
1.7.1 Probationary employees may be reclassified to a
higher grade or salary as a result of market
analysis.
Termination - An employee may be terminated at any time
during the probationary period without right of appeal,
hearing or progressive discipline except in cases of
alleged discrimination. Notice of dismissal and date of
termination shall be submitted by letter to the employee.
A copy of the letter and the CP4 must be submitted to the
Personnel Division.
1.8.1 A person terminated during their merit probation
period shall not be reinstated on a merit
employment register without competition and
certification, unless waived by the Personnel
Division Director.
1.8.2 Employees in good standing who terminate or are
terminated while on probation or extended
probation shall be eligible for rehire into the
same classification without competition and
certification through the Personnel Division.
1.8.3 Individuals who have satisfactorily completed
merit probation or an extended merit probation
and who terminate employment with Salt Lake
County in good standing, are eligible for rehire
into any County position for which they qualify
without competition.

Full-Time Merit Employment (Status 02)
2.1 Full-time merit employees work an average of 40 hours per
week.
2.2 Full-time merit employees receive all County benefits.
2.3 The number of hours worked per week may not be
permanently changed without position reallocation from
the Personnel Division and a Personnel Action Form (CP4)
changing the status.
2.4 Full-time merit status employees are eligible for
reclassification, promotion and transfer.
2.5 Full-time merit employees shall be paid on a salaried
basis.
2.6 Full-time merit employment follows the completion of the
original or extended probationary period. No employee
can be placed in a full-time merit employment status
until they have completed an original probationary
period.
2.7 Individuals who have satisfactorily completed merit
probation or an extended merit probation and who
terminate employment with Salt Lake County in good
standing, are eligible for rehire into any County
position for which they qualify without competition.
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3.0

Part-Time Merit Employment With County Benefits (Status 08)
3.1 For record keeping purposes, the status of part-time
merit with County benefits employees will always remain
08 - even during the original merit probationary period.
3.2 Part-time merit employees with County benefits shall work
at least an average of twenty hours per week but less
than forty.
3.3 Part-time merit employees with County benefits receive
most benefits pro-rated to the number of hours worked
except that they may be required to pay a different
percentage of costs for fixed benefits such as insurance.
3.4 After completion of the original probationary period,
part-time merit employees with County benefits may be
reclassified, promoted or transferred.
3.4.1 Part-time merit employees with County benefits
serving a probationary period may be reclassified
to higher grade or salary as a result of a market
analysis.
3.5 The number of hours worked per week may be changed at any
time.
If adjusted to less than an average of twenty
hours per week, more than thirty hours per week, or to
forty hours per week, during a calendar year, a status
change shall be submitted on a* Personnel Action Form
(CP4).
J . 6 Part-time merit employees with County benefits shall be
paid on an hourly basis.
3.7 Individuals who have satisfactorily completed merit
probation or an extended merit probation and who
terminate employment with Salt Lake County in good
standing, are eligible for rehire into any County
position for which they qualify without competition.

4.0

Part-Time Merit Employment Without County Benefits (Status 09)
4.1 For record keeping purposes, the status of part-time
merit employees without County benefits will always
remain 09 - even during the original merit probationary
period.
4.2 Part-time merit employees without County benefits shall
work less than an average of twenty hours per week.
4.3 Part-time merit employees without benefits do not receive
any County benefits.
4.4 After completion of the original probationary period,
part-time merit employees without County benefits may be
reclassified, promoted or transferred.
4.5 The number of hours worked per week may be changed at any
time. If permanently adjusted to more than an average of
twenty hours per week, more than thirty hours per week,
or to forty hours per week, during a calendar year, a
status change shall be submitted on a Personnel Action
Form (CP4).
4.6 Part-time merit employees without benefits shall be paid
on an hourly basis.

5.0

Exempt Employment Status
5.1 For payroll purposes there are seven specific categories
of exempt employees - 04, Provisional; 05, Temporary; 93,
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Interns; 94 Reserve Deputy; 95, Appointed; 96 Federal
Program (or related); 97 Elected Officials.
Status 04 - Provisional Appointments
5.2.1 The Personnel Division shall review and approve
all requests for provisional appointments.
5.2.2 A provisional appointment cannot be made until a
position has been allocated, classified, had
minimum qualifications established and a Request
For Eligible Form (CP2) has been submitted to the
Personnel Division.
5.2.3 Administrators may request that an individual be
considered for provisional employment if:
5.2.3.1 there are urgent reasons for filling the
position and the Personnel Division is
unable to make satisfactory certification
from a register; or
5.2.3.2 individuals
who
are
eligible
for
reassignment,
rehire,
reinstatement,
reclassification or promotion are deemed
inappropriate for the position.
5.2.4 After the Personnel Division certifies that an
individual meets the minimum qualifications of a
position, the person may be provisionally
appointed to fill the existing vacancy until an
employment register is established.
5.2.5 Provisional appointments shall not be continued
beyond 3 0 calendar days after the establishment
of an employment register or beyond the length of
a probationary period, whichever comes first.
5.2.6 The recruitment process shall proceed as quickly
as possible.
5.2.7 A position shall not be filled by repeated
provisional appointments.
5.2.8 Time spent in the position as a provisional
employee shall be credited towards the merit
probationary period.
5.2.9 Provisional employees accumulate vacation and
sick leave, receive holiday pay and are eligible
for
retirement
and
insurance
benefits
commensurate with the number of hours worked.
Temporary Appointments (Status 05)
5.3.1 A temporary appointment may not be made until a
description of duties has been submitted to the
Personnel Division who will assign an appropriate
grade and pay range.
If a current position
description already exists, the grade and pay
range previously established will be used.
5.3.2 The hiring authority may directly hire a
temporary employee with the exception of a
position which is covered by the CLERICAL open
recruitment registers. These employees shall be
hired in the manner described in Personnel Policy
and Procedure - Filling County Job Vacancies and
may be transitioned to probationary status in the
same position for which they were hired as a
temporary.
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5.3.3

Under no circumstances shall a temporary employee
work more than 1,040 hours per calendar year.
5.3.4 Temporary employees shall be paid on an hourly
basis and within the pay range of the grade
established by the Personnel Division for the
position and approved by the Board of County
Commissioners.
5.3.4.1 In order to pay a temporary above the
established
grade
range,
the
Administrator must prepare a letter of
justification that must be approved by
the Board of County Commissioners through
the Personnel Division.
5.3.5 The time spent in a temporary appointment shall
not be considered part of the merit probationary
period.
5.3.6 Temporary employees are not eligible for County
benefits.
5.3.7 Temporary employees are not considered merit
employees, they are "at will" employees who may
be terminated for any reason, without notice and
without a pre-termination hearing.
5.3.8 Temporary appointments are subject to the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Overtime hours for all temporary employees
are accrued at one and a half time the hours
worked and shall be paid in cash.
5.3.9 Overtime hours shall be counted towards the 1,040
hours permitted in any calendar year.
Interns (Status 93)
5.4.1 Student interns are hired in this status.
5.4.2 When the hiring authority wishes to hire an
intern, they shall provide the Personnel Division
with a letter from the college, university or
other
training
institution
verifying
the
individual's enrollment and the relevancy of the
work experience to the student's education. The
hiring authority will ensure that the intern will
receive
competent
supervision
from
County
employees for the period of the internship.
5.4.3 The internship shall not be used as a means to
replace or eliminate full-time merit employees.
5.4.4 The appropriate stipend for each appointment
shall be determined in consultation with the
Personnel Division, with final approval from the
Board of County Commissioners.
5.4.5 Interns are not eligible for any County benefits.
Reserve Deputy (Status 94)
5.5.1 Reserve Deputies are hired in this status.
5.5.2 Reserve Deputies are not eligible for any County
benefits.
Appointed (Status 95)
5.6.1 Appointments made by Elected Officials to fill
exempt Chief Deputy, Administrative Assistant to
the County Commissioners, Confidential Secretary
Page 7 of 11

00529

5100
5.6.2

5.6.3

5.6.4
5.6.5

5.6.6
5.6.7

positions, and exempt Administrators, are hired
in this status if one is assigned by the Board of
County Commissioners.
Appointments made by Elected Officials to fill
confidential
and/or
key
policy-determining
positions are also hired in this status.
All
positions designated as being exempt under this
subparagraph shall be listed by job title and
department, office or agency.
Any change in
exempt status shall constitute an amendment to
this policy and procedure.
5.6.2.1 The following positions are exempt under
the provisions of sub paragraph 5.6.2:
^Community Information Director - County
Commission.
Commission Office Assistant - County
Commission
*Deputy Fire Chief - Fire Division.
*Fire Chief - Fire Division.
*Intergovernmental Relations Manager Commission Staff.
*Law Clerk Bailiff-Sheriffs Office
^Personnel Division Director - Department
of Community & Support Services
Appointed positions receive comparable benefits
as merit employees except as listed below.
5.6.3.1 They do not accrue vacation and sick
leave.
5.6.3.2 They cannot be promoted or transferred to
a merit position unless certified from a
merit system register.
5.6.3.3 They cannot be promoted or transferred to
a merit position unless they previously
encumbered a merit position.
5.6.3.4 They do not receive a County preference
adjustment when competing in merit
registers.
5.6.3.5 They do not have the right of appeal or
hearing, except in cases of alleged
discrimination.
Salary ranges for exempt appointments are set by
the Personnel Division subject to the approval of
the Board of County Commissioners.
If certified and hired for a merit position,
individuals shall carry all benefits accrued and
retain their original service date (adjusted for
interrupted County service) and at the option of
the hiring authority, may be transferred at the
same salary - not to exceed the pay range maximum.
All appointed employees who are hired into merit
positions shall be required to serve
an original
probationary period.
Merit employees who have accepted an appointment to
an appointed position and are not retained by the
appointing officer shall:
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5.7

5.6.7.1 be appointed to any Career Service position
for which they qualify in a pay grade
comparable to their last position in Career
Service provided an opening exists; or
5.6.7.2 be appointed to a lesser Career Service
position for which they qualify pending the
opening of a position described in 5.6.6.1.
5.6.8 Full-time merit employees who transfer to an
appointed position and transfer back to a merit
position, with no break in service, are not
required to serve another merit probationary
period.
5.6.9 When creating an appointed position, the following
procedure shall be followed:
5.6.9.1 the Administrator shall make a written
request to the Personnel Division Director
for the change of status of a specific
position, and shall provide the Personnel
Division Director with a written job
description and proposed justification of
the change.
5.6.9.1.1 The Personnel Division Director may
also initiate a request concerning a
change in the exempt or non-exempt
status of any position within Salt
Lake County Government.
5.6.10 The Personnel Division Director shall review the
request to determine if the change of status
requirements of the County Personnel Management Act
are met.
The Personnel Division Director shall
prepare
written
findings
of
fact
and
a
recommendation which shall be forwarded to the
Career Service Council and the requesting party.
5.6.11 The Career Service Council shall review the
Personnel Division Director's findings of fact and
decision and will conduct a public hearing to rule
on the change of status request. The Council shall
schedule a public hearing within 10 days of receipt
of the request to solicit input regarding the
proposed change.
Notice of the public hearing
shall be circulated in the same manner as County
job announcements. Such notice shall include the
source and proposed justification of the request.
5.6.12 The Career Service Council shall prepare written
findings of fact and a final decision regarding the
request for change in status which shall be
forwarded to the governing body, the Personnel
Division Director and the requesting Administrator.
Federal Manpower Program or Related (Status 96)
5.7.1 Applies to individuals hired through the Federal
Manpower Training or similar programs.
5.7.2 Employees may be salaried or hourly.
5.7.3 Employees in this status are eligible for all
County benefits except 1) the Tuition Assistance
Program; and 2) they cannot be transferred or
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5.8

promoted to a merit position unless they were
certified on a merit system register by the
Personnel Division.
In lieu of the County's
preference adjustment on merit registers, employees
in
this
status,
who
meet
the
minimum
qualifications, shall receive double credit for
their related county experience in the program (6
months = 12 months experience) when applying and
competing on a merit register.
5.7.4 If certified and hired for a merit position,
individuals shall carry all benefits accrued and
retain their original service date (adjusted for
interrupted County service) and at the option of
the hiring authority, may be transferred at the
same salary - not to exceed the pay range maximum.
Elected Officials (Status 97)
5.8.1 Includes County Commissioners, Assessor, County
Attorney, District Attorney,
Auditor, Clerk,
Recorder, Sheriff, Surveyor, and Treasurer.
5.8.2 Salaries are set by the governing body.
5.8.3 Elected
officials
receive
comparable
County
benefits.
5.8.4 Elected officials may move to a merit position only
after successfully competing and being certified by
the Personnel Division.
5.8.5 If certified and hired for a merit position,
individuals shall carry all benefits accrued and
retain their original service date (adjusted for
interrupted County service) and at the option of
the hiring authority, may be transferred at the
same salary - not to exceed the pay range maximum.
5.8.6 Elected officials who are hired into merit
positions shall be required to serve an original
probationary period.
5.8.7 Full-time merit employees who transfer to an
Elected Office and transfer back to a merit
position, with no break in service, are not
required to serve another merit probationary
period.
5.8.8 Merit employees who are elected to office and are
not re-elected shall:
5.8.8.1 be appointed to any merit position for
which
they qualify
in a pay grade
comparable to their last merit position
provided an opening exists; or
5.8.8.2 be appointed to a lesser merit position for
which they qualify pending the opening of a
position described above.
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APPROVED AND PASSED THIS

OF

&i.*0ss^tf"

, 1996

BOARD OF COUNTY C0MM]
COMMISSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

By:

^"TTUS,.,,

£

-Brent gVercon,

Chairman^^j? LJ^<?\

U
ATTEST:

7

L ^ A J . , ; V K /. ,r

^ , ? ^

^

'Sherri Swensen
S^-c. Lake County Clerk
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
By:
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SALT LAKE COUNTY
PROBATIONARY PERIOD NOTICE

Salt Lake County has a six-month probationary period for new employees. This is a time for both you and
your supervisor to evaluate whether there is a match between the job and your skills and interests. The
probationary period is used for the effective adjustment of the new employee to meet acceptable work
standards. You should discuss these standards with your supervisor.
You should receive regular performance feedback from your supervisor during the first few months of your
probationary period. You must receive a formal performance evaluation from your supervisor prior to
completion of the six month probationary period. You may, however, be separated from service at any time
for unsatisfactory performance including inappropriate or unprofessional behavior during the six-month
probationary period for any non-discriminatory reason or no reason. Employees who are terminated will
be notified in writing of the proposed termination and the effective date.
Duhng this probationary period, as in all other aspects of employment with Salt Lake County, you are
protected against discrimination on the basis of race, color, disability, national origin, age, sex, sexual
orientation, marital status or religion. If you believe such discrimination has occurred, the County grievance
and appeal procedure is available to you. •
I understand that my employment with Salt Lake County is probationary for six months from my
hire date. I further understand that my performance will be monitored during the probationary period by
my supervisor and that I will receive a formal evaluation prior to completion of the six month probationary
period. Retention is at my supervisor's discretion, and I understand that I am not entitled to progressive
discipline. This decision may not be appealed except on the grounds of discrimination. I understand that
my probationary period may be extended up to an additional six (6) months.
Please sign below to indicate you have read and understand the procedure specified above.

PRINT NAME

SIGNATURE

DATE

REFERENCE: Salt Lake County Personnel Policies & Procedures
REV 06/96
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5200
SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY & PROCEDURE
ALLOCATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF MERIT POSITIONS
REFERENCE
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotated, 17-33
Personnel Policy & Procedure:
General Definitions
Pay Practices
Reduction-in-Force Separations
PURPOSE
To establish procedures by which Salt Lake County shall monitor and
control the classification and allocation of County merit
positions.
POLICY
Upon approval from the Board of County Commissioners, the Personnel
Division shall allocate new or additional merit positions to
requesting agencies. No person shall be hired or appointed, and no
merit employee shall be promoted or transferred to any position,
until it has been approved, classified and allocated.
PROCEDURE
1.0

2.0

Administrators shall submit, in writing, to the Board of
County
Commissioners
through Personnel,
requests
for
reclassifications, new or additional allocations, to transfer
an allocation from one payroll unit to another or to abolish
an allocation.
Upon approval, the Board of County
Commissioners shall authorize the Personnel Division to
allocate,
transfer
or
abolish
the
allocation(s)
as
appropriate.
1.1 The effective date for new, additional, reclassified or
transferred allocations shall be the beginning of the
first pay period following receipt of the agency request
and\or the new position description in the Personnel
Office.
An allocation shall not be classified or reclassified unless
the Personnel Division has received a new position description
or has an existing position description or class specification
Page 1 of 3

00535

5200
on file.
2.1 The position description, at a minimum, shall include the
critical or essential objectives and tasks of the
position. The class specification should reflect the
general types of duties and responsibilities performed by
employees in the occupational group.
2.2 Supervisors shall be held accountable for the accuracy of
position descriptions and for notifying the Personnel
Division of significant and substantive changes in duties
and responsibilities consistent with the procedures
described in this policy.
2.3 Supervisors shall prepare position descriptions in the
approved standard format and submit them to the Personnel
Division after ensuring they are signed and approved by
the parties identified on the position description form.
2.4 The Personnel Division shall maintain a file of position
descriptions or class specifications for each Agency.
The Personnel Division shall prepare a letter to notify the
Administrators and incumbents of the allocation change to
include the effective date, the job code, FLSA status, title,
grade, and full time equivalency (FTE).
Minimum qualifications for County positions shall be seL by
the Personnel Division.
4.1 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet
the new minimum qualifications as established by
personnel, and is not required to do so by law, he or sne
shall be grandfathered into the reclassified position.
4.2 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet
the new minimum qualifications and is required to do so
by law, grandfathering shall be prohibited and the
following procedures shall apply:
4.2.1 Probationary employees will be terminated in good
standing.
4.2.2 Merit employees may be transferred, reassigned,
or promoted to another position in accordance
with
Personnel
Policy
and
Procedure:
Pay
Practices; OR
4.2.3 The employee may be terminated in accordance with
Personnel Policy and Procedure: Reduction-inForce Separations.
An official record of Salt Lake County allocations shall be
maintained by the Personnel Division.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY & PROCEDURE
ALLOCATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF MERIT POSITIONS

APPROVED AND ADOPTED this

day of

^

* 5 W7

1997.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

ATTEST:

SHERRIE SWENSEN,
• Salt Lake County Clerk
Commissioner Callaghan voted
Commissioner Horiuchi voted
Commissioner Overson voted

^e*^C-£3 AS TO ?Offifi

IA£
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5400
SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE
PAY PRACTICES
REFERENCE

Personnel Policy & Procedure: Filling County Job Vacancies
General Definitions
Utah Code Annotated, County Personnel Management Act, 17-33-5
Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment Riches Act, 1994;
38 U.S.C.; 4301-4333
PURPOSE
To identify and provide for the consistent application of payadjustments resulting from the execution of a personnel policy,
procedure, practice or action.
THE PERSONNEL DIVISION DIRECTOR AND THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS WILL NOT BE BOUND BY PROMISES OR COMMITMENTS MADE TO
EMPLOYEES OR PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES REGARDING PAY, UNLESS THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS POLICY ARE FOLLOWED.
PROCEDURE
1.0

2.0

Ail salary increase requests, in excess of 10%, will be
reviewed for approval by the Personnel Division Director and
must be justified in writing. For those requests that exceed
the mid-point of the salary range more extensive justification
and prior written approval of the Personnel Division Director
will be required. In all instances, the administrator ^shall
pay particular attention to the impact the proposed salary
will have on existing employees. Additional areas that must
be addressed in any letter of justification are listed below:
1.1 Relatedness of education and experience, including
licenses, certifications, etc.;
1.2 An overall evaluation of the applicants qualifications
compared to other applicants OR to existing County
employees within the agency or Division payroll unit;
1.3 Market conditions - supply and demand of the labor
market;
1.4 Impact of not hiring, promoting or transferring this
employee or applicant at the requested salary.
ACTING-IN-POSITION
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2.4

0

assignment.
While Acting-in-Positicn the employee may be permanently
promoted following applicable Salt Lake County Personnel
Policies and Procedures.

CAREER LADDER
3.1 Salt Lake County establishes career ladders to provide
career development opportunities for employees.
3.1.1 A career ladder will typically consist of two or
mere grades constituting the entry and working
level or the entry, working and senior level. All
levels are identified by the same title and job
code. However, each level has distinguishing
duties, responsibilities and characteristics.
Advancement through the levels is dependent upon
meeting the established career ladder advancement
criteria. The position is classified at the
highest level and the career development\training
levels are established below.
3.2 Career ladders are subject to the approval of the
Personnel Division Director. Administrators wishing to
develop career ladders should follow the regular position
description review process as outlined in Salt Lake
County Personnel Policy and Procedure, Allocation and
Classification of Merit Positions. The Administrator
must
request
that
the
position
submitted
for
classification or reclassification be assigned to a
career ladder.
Administrators must clearly define the
differences between each level of the career ladder
before the structure is implemented. In addition, they
must develop and submit written criteria for advancement
to the next level in the career ladder.
3.2.1 Advancement
through the
career
ladder
is
primarily
dependent
upon
satisfactorily
performing the duties of and meeting
the
advancement criteria of the next higher level.
Advancement criteria shall be applied uniformly
to all employees in the particular career ladder.
3.3 A merit employee who has met or exceeded the established
advancement
criteria for the career ladder plus
demonstrated the ability to perform the duties of the
next highest level of the career ladder must be advanced.
3.4 A merit employee who has received a career ladder
advancement must have his/her pay adjusted to at least
the new pay range minimum.
3.4.1 Pay adjustments above the pay range minimum may
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6.1

6.2

A new hire merit employee may be hired 0% through 10%,
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of
Personnel Action Form (CP-4) .
A new hire merit employee may be hired more than 10%
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of
Personnel Action Form (CP-4).
In addition, the
Administrator muse prepare a letter of justification that:
must be approved by the Eoard of County Commissioners
through the Personnel Division Director.

7.0

PROMOTION
7.1 All merit employees may be promoted into higher grade
positions for which they meet the minimum education and
experience requirements and are certified as eligible by
the Personnel Division.
7.1.1 Probationary employees may not be promoted unless
they have been certified from a
merit register developed for the higher grade
position.
These employees will be required to
serve a new merit probationary period.
7.2 A merit employee who has been promoted must have the pay
adjusted to at least the new pay range minimum.
7.2.1 Pay adjustments above the pay range minimum may
be made as follows:
7.2.1.1
A promotion with a pay adjustment of 0%
through 10% may be initiated by
completing a Notice of Personnel Action
Form (CP-4).
7.2.1.2
A promotion with a pay adjustment of
more than 10% may be initiated by
completing a Notice of Personnel Action
Form
(CP-4) . - In
addition,. the
Administrator must prepare a letter of
justification that must be approved by
the Board of County Commissioners
through
the
Personnel
Division
Director.

8.0

REASSIGNMENT
8.1 An employee may be reassigned on a temporary or permanent
basis for the purposes of improved administrative
practices, reorganization or for any other nondisciplinary reason.
A reassignment may require a
Personnel Action Form (C?4) if there is a change in grade
or job code.
8.2 An employee may be eligible for a pay adjustment due to
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review
the
request
for
certification
and
determine the individuals eligibility for rehire
by verifying that the individual:
11.1.3.1 completed a County probationary period;
11.1.3.2 left the County in good standing (was
not terminated for cause);
11.1.3.3 meets
the
current
minimum
job
qualifications required for entry to
the available position.
11.1.4 The
Personnel
Division
shall
nocify
the
requesting Administrator of the individuals
eligibility for rehire.
11.1.5 If not certified as eligible for rehire by the
Personnel Division, the Administrator shall
inform the individual, in writing, of the
decision.
11.2 A former merit employee may be rehired 0% through 10%,
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of
Personnel Action Form (CP-4).
11.3 A former merit employee may be rehired more than 10%
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of
Personnel Action Form (CP-4) .
In addition, the
Administrator must prepare a letter of justification than
must be approved by the Board of County Commissioners
through the Personnel Division Director.
11.4 A rehired employee shall have his/her service,
date
adjusted to reflect all previous merit employment with
Salt Lake County. The adjusted service date will be used
for the purpose of determining vacation accrual, awarding
employee service awards, employee service certificates
and reduction-in-force retention points.
12.0 REINSTATEMENT
12.1 Reinstatement applies to a merit employee who (a) has
been reduced-in-force within the last six (6) months, or
(b) is a veteran eligible under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Act, or (c) has been
reinstated as a result of Career Service Council or
subsequent court action.
12.1.1 A merit employee who has been reinstated within
six (6) months of being reduced-in-force must
have his/her pay and/or benefits restored as
follows:

12.1.1.1

The employee will be required to serve
a merit probation period unless the
employee is being hired in the same

5400

12.1.3

left for military service.
This
includes all general, cost-of-living
and length of service increases.
12.1.2.2 The employee shall have his/her service
date adjusted to reflect their previous
merit employment plus a reasonable
period
between
leaving
county
employment
and
entering
military
service, the entire pericd of military
service and the period between release
from the service and their return to
work. The adjusted ser/ice date will
be used for the purpose of determining
vacation accrual, awarding employee
service awards and employee service
certificates and for the calculation of
Reduction-in-Force retention points.
12.1.2.3 Upon
application,
the
employee's
health, dental, life, etc. benefits
will be restored without the required
waiting period.
12.1.2.4 The employee shall have his/her sick
leave hours restored.
A merit employee who has been reinstated as a
result of Career Service Council or subsequent
court action must have his/her pay and/or
benefits restored as directed by the Career
Service Council or court.
12.1.3.1 When the county has been directed to
rehire an employee who has
been
reinstated by Career Service Council or
court action and a vacancy no longer
exists, the Reduction-in-Force Policy
#5720 shall be applied.

13.0 TRANSFER (County)
13.1 A merit employee may transfer from one payroll unit to
another within the County subject to the approval of the
Board of County Commissioners through the Personnel
Division Director. When transferring between payroll
units the following procedures apply:
13.1.1 The new payroll unit must request that the
Personnel Division verify that the employee meets
the minimum qualifications of the position.
13.1.2 The new payroll unit must contact the old payroll
unit to arrange for a mutually agreeable transfer
P a g e 9 of
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14.2 The transferring employee may be hired 0% through 10%,
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of
Personnel Action Form (CP-4).
14.3 The transferring employee may be hired more than 10%
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of
Personnel Action Form (CP-4).
In addition, the
Administrator must prepare and attach a letter of
justification that must be approved by the Board of
County Commissioners through the Personnel Division
Director.
14.4 When an individual transfers to the Salt Lake County
merit system from another equivalent public merit system
jurisdiction, as provided for under U.C.A. 17-33-3 and
17-33-5(3)(b)(xii), they will be treated as a new hire
merit employee and as such will be required to serve a
probationary period.
14.5 The transferring employee shall have his/her
service
date adjusted to reflect all previous merit employment
with
the
other
equivalent
public
merit
system
jurisdiction if there has been no break in service and a
formal request is made to the Personnel Office within the
first six (6) months of employment.
14.6 A transferring employee may take up to thirty calendar
days off before reporting to work with Salt Lake County
without it being considered a break in service if the
transfer was arranged for before the individual left his
previous job assignment or as part of the hire
negotiations with Salt Lake County.
14.7 The adjusted service date will be used for the purpose of
determining vacation accrual and awarding employee
service awards retention points and employee service
certificates.
TRANSFER (Assimilation)
When a program or service is transferred through assimilation
to Salt Lake County government, from another public
jurisdiction, the merit employee (s) of the original provider
automatically become employees of the Salt Lake County merit
system. As such, all their benefits are transferred to or
comparable benefits are provided by Salt Lake County.
All
employees who transfer with the program or service shall have
their service date adjusted to reflect all previous merit
employment with the other public jurisdiction. The adjusted
service date will be used for the purpose of determining
vacation accrual, reduction-in-force, awarding
employee
service awards and employee service certificate.
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Salt Lake County Public Works Department
Administration Division
Mary Callaghan, Commissioner
J D Johnson, Department Director
Larry Moller, Division Director

S A L T LUKE CQUItTY

DECEIVED
MAR 2 0 2000

SALT LAKE

COUNTY

GOVERNMENT

CENTER

2001 S State Street

March 16, 2000
SALTL'
PERSOK

Suite N3100
Salt Lake City
Utah 84190-4000

Felix McGowan
Personnel Division Director
2001 South State Street, N4600
Salt Lake City Utah 84190

Tei (801)468-3771
Fax (801)468-3712

Dear Felix
SUBJECT Career Ladder Plan - Engineer 26/28/30
We respectfully request approval of the Career Ladder Plan as wntten for the Engineer 26/28/30 position
As you know, we have this classification in three Public Works divisions, Flood Control, Engineering and
Planning/Development Services
The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 26 to the 28 level are as follows
1
2
3

The employee has worked for one year as a grade 26
The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year as shown by
receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory rating
The employee has received their Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) certification by the
National Council of Examiners for Engineering

The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 28 to the 30 level are as follows
1.
2
3

The employee has worked for one year as a grade 28
The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year as shown by
receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory rating
The employee has received their Professional Engineer (PE) License in the State of
Utah

/ ^RespectfyfI5\

vh<
D Johnson Director
Pubiic Works Department

i

cc

Neil D Stack, P E Director
Engineering Flood Control

Cal Schneller, Director
Planning/Development Services

Sharon Hoglund

JDJ33

00-164

